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This document contains a number of chapters, all of which are related to understanding and an-
alyzing various aspects of attack operations in Theater Ballistic Missile Defense (TMD). The ma-
terial has been developed by NPS faculty members George W. Conner, CAPT., USN (Ret), Kneale
T. Marshall and James J. Wirtz from our own research and that of our students in the Operations
Analysis curriculum at the Naval Postgraduate School during the period July, 1992 through June,
1997: Mark A. Ehlers, Thomas W. Hair, Joseph P. Mattis, Paul A. Soutter, Vernon L. Junker, and
Neil E. Fitzpatrick.
The three pillars ofTMD are (a) Attack Operations - attacking the missile launch system prior
to launch, (b) Active Defense - shooting down the missile at some point in its trajectory, and (c)
Passive Defense - protecting the missiles' intended targets by hardening and other means. The
models and analyses in this document are all concerned with various aspects of Attack Operations.
Past history, from countering the V-2's in World War II through the attempts made to destroy Scud
launchers in Iraq during Desert Storm, has shown how difficult it is to succeed when attacking
launchers. It seems natural to assume that success in this area be measured simply by the fraction
of launchers killed in a given campaign. The fact that the fraction of hard launcher kills has histor-
ically been very low, despite considerable attack operations' efforts, has led many to believe that
efforts to achieve TMD should be concentrated in Active Defense. Indeed, considerable resources
are being spent on difficult and highly technical methods of destroying the missile after it has been
launched. The weapon used for Active Defense in Desert Storm was the Patriot missile. Far more
sophisticated and expensive systems are currently under development to achieve higher missile kill
fractions. These include the Air Force-sponsored laser beam weapon to destroy a missile in its
boost phase, the Army-sponsored theater high altitude defense (THAAD) weapon and modifica-
tions to the Navy's Standard missile to destroy a missile in its reentry phase, and improvements to
Patriot as well as new weapons to destroy a missile in its final phase. Compared to the resources
being expended on these programs little is being spent on efforts to improve attack operations ca-
pability.
To be successful, attack operations against theater ballistic missiles (TBMs) require the follow-
ing ordered set of information and procedures: ( 1 ) knowledge that mobile missile launchers are op-
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crating in a given area, (2) equipment and procedures that can find and identify the launchers from
other moving vehicles of lesser interest, and (3) equipment and procedures with which to attack
and destroy the launchers or their resupply points either before or after they have launched a mis-
sile. This is the sequence of events that has been in use by the Navy in the important and difficult
task of countering enemy submarines since the U-boat war in the Atlantic in World War II.
Chapter 2 discusses the similarities and differences between the TMD problem and the Anti-Sub-
marine Warfare (ASW) problem. Although the physical and environmental differences between
search, identifying and destroying a target on land are clearly different from those used against a
target in water, the two missions have a great deal of structural similarity. Chapter 3 expands on
the ideas in Chapter 2 and argues that, with the ASW model in mind, the attack operations in TMD
are essentially a joint operations problem.
Chapter 4 contains an overall model of the TMD problem from loading a mobile launcher, set-
ting up and firing its missile, missile trajectory, and launcher reload to repeat this cycle of opera-
tions. This model is based on a U-boat circulation model found in Reference [4] that was first
adapted to the TMD problem by Mark A. Ehlers in his MS thesis. The object of the analysis shown
there is to quantify the relative contributions of both attack operations and active defense to TMD,
It is shown that a modest amount of success in attack operations significantly reduces the numbers
of the (very expensive) weapons required for active defense. Not only would modest success in at-
tack operations lead to considerable cost avoidance, it will be necessary to achieve feasible active
defense with the number of defensive weapons the U.S. will be able to afford. This material has
appeared in Reference [7] and is based in part on results presented in Reference [6].
Having demonstrated a need for successful attack operations the question arises as to how to
achieve success in this area given the poor historical performance record. Chapter 5 presents re-
sults of models that describe aerial search along road systems. It is demonstrated how the problem
is affected by factors such as the traffic density along the road and the mixture of launchers together
with other traffic. As is the case in search at sea, the coverage ratio, that fraction of the road that
can be overflown by a search vehicle while the missile launcher is visible, plays a major role in
determining the effectiveness of the search effort.
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Although hard-launcher-kills is clearly a major measure of effectiveness, it is not the only one.
By this measure, historical records show that attack operations have been mostly unsuccessful. But
a deeper study of the data available from Desert Storm indicates that significant launch suppression
was achieved by having air search assets operating in the launch areas. Chapter 6 contains a simple
model to measure this launch suppression in terms of equivalent missile kill rate, especially for
campaigns of short duration.
Chapter 7 models the difficult decision problem of what type of operations should be undertak-
en in the period before hostilities break out. In particular, when would it pay to make a preemptive
strike against launchers if mobilization of the opposing force has been observed? What data is re-
quired to analyze such problems and how should the decision maker weigh the intelligence at hand.
Chapter 8 presents models to optimally distribute ground sensors to monitor and detect time
critical target traffic on road systems, and to determine the best operating policy to use with these
sensors.
Much of the material in this report has appeared in various places, including the open literature,
technical reports, MS student theses, and briefing slides. By gathering the various pieces together
into a common source it is hoped that this document will be useful both in operations analysis
courses and as a source of ideas for further studies to solve what is one the military's top priority
problems, TMD.
This work represents an incomplete look at the entire TMD campaign. Additional studies
should be undertaken to understand the entire TMD problem. Without this understanding, one can-
not realistically and efficiently model, simulate, develop the necessary tactics, or develop an oper-
ational campaign to defeat, or at least suppress, this threat.
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As evidenced by the Persian Gulf War, the short range ballistic missile (SRBM) is a highly ef-
fective political weapon even when its direct military effectiveness is, as in the case of the non-
guided SCUD missile used by Iraq, relatively low (Reference [1]). Public fears and possible polit-
ical repercussions created by SCUD missile launches forced the Allies to divert a significant per-
centage of air sorties, previously scheduled for other missions, to hunt for both fixed launch sites
and mobile launchers. The degree to which the Iraqi government measured the success of their
SRBM force is thought to be based largely on the capability of continuous SCUD missile launches
throughout the war, independent of whether the intended target was destroyed or not. By this mea-
sure the mission was highly successful.
The scramble to destroy the mobile SRBM launchers became headline news as the war pro-
ceeded and a number of SCUD missiles penetrated the air defenses of the Coalition; a few reached
their targets inside Israel and Saudi Arabia. The speculation that Iraq might use chemical warheads
on its missiles increased the urgency of the launcher destroy mission. One can assume that other
potential third world adversaries noted the success of Iraq's mobile missile force and might view
them as an effective weapon system in which to invest. The threat appears to be increasing and will
probably become more accurate and lethal with time.
2.2 The Mobile SRBM Counter Effort
The mission of defeating or significantly suppressing the mobile SRBM threat is difficult. Post
Desert Storm analyses have revised downward the optimistic war time battle damage assessment
(BDA) of a significant percentage of mobile launchers destroyed (Reference [2]). Some reports
have indicated numbers close to zero for the estimated number destroyed during the conflict. The
1. This material in this pajjer is taken from Ref. [6].
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effectiveness of the PATRIOT system in defeating incoming missiles is also under debate. All re-
ports agree that the inclusive counter effort failed to produce results that normally indicate mission
success.
2.3 An Integrated Approach
Current research and development to counter the mobile SRBM threat is focused primarily on
post-missile-launch hardware and tactics to counter both the missiles and the mobile launchers
(Reference [3]). Air defense systems such as PATRIOT are being designed to kill incoming mis-
siles. Weapon systems are being developed to allow for greater success in the prosecution of
launchers after missile launch cuing data is received, referred to in this thesis as the flaming datum
tactic. These approaches assume that the mobile SRBM problem begins after missile launch.
This report focuses on the benefits and policy development of prosecuting the mobile launchers
themselves prior to both missile launch and hostilities.
The analyst familiar with the general principles of anti-submarine warfare (ASW) find the poor
results of the counter effort to suppress mobile SCUD launcher activity during the Persian Gulf
War to be no surprise. An effective counter effort against a highly elusive target such as a mobile
missile launcher or a submarine, should not begin after weapon release, as is the current focus with
the SRBM, but well before the threat is in the position to do so. This section introduces the concept
of using search tactics prior to missile launch as well as pre-hostility intelligence effort in counter-
ing the mobile launcher, and suggests using an existing structure to create an effective counter ef-
fort doctrine.
2.4 Anti-Submarine Warfare and SCUD Hunting
The capability to detect, track, classify, and if needed, destroy an enemy submarine has in-
creased dramatically over the last half century. A Second World War air crewman, while visually
(and later with the help of radar) searching the thousands of square miles of the Bay of Biscay for
German U-boats, would have dismissed as impossible the idea of one day passively tracking a sub-
marine while it is submerged. Today, this is commonplace. The ASW community has been effec-
tively searching for increasingly invisible targets for many years; the lessons have already been
learned and, in many cases, can be adapted to counter mobile missile launchers (Reference [8]).
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The general principles that provide the structure for the current ASW doctrine have been de-
veloped through theory and tested by experience as the submarine gained in capability and stealth
sophistication. Although the specific tactics and hardware will be different, many of these princi-
ples that have brought success to ASW apply directly to countering mobile missile launchers. List-
ed below is just a sampling of ASW principles that require consideration, each with a brief
statement relating them to the mobile SRBM problem.
a) Strong community identification. Like ASW, the mobile SRBM counter effort
requires a dedicated community that is committed to defeating the threat. The pre-
dicted diversity of such an effort (possibly from special force units on the ground to
satellites in space) will place a need for a strong community identification with a
defined focal point for all aspects of the counter effort.
b) Intense scrutiny of enemy signatures. Every possible signature, ranging from
the obvious (infrared, electromagnetic, etc.) to the not so obvious (seismic, aural,
tire patterns, etc.) needs careful examination for potential exploitation. Signatures
play a crucial role in both detection and classification of targets.
c) Understanding enemy tactics.The ability to predict or estimate the actions of
the enemy mobile launcher force is invaluable in developing tactics for specific sit-
uations.
d) Environment considerations. The environment of the counter effort will
change from enemy to enemy, country to country. Future conflicts may not all be
fought in a desert environment, as was the Persian Gulf War.
e) Heavy emphasis on intelligence. Mobile launcher search without intelligence is
much like a needle search in one of many haystacks. Intelligence (HUMINT,
ELINT, etc.) can narrow the search to a single haystack, effectively giving the
search effort a starting point.
f) Localization capabilities on many platforms. The more platforms with the ca-
pability to localize a target the better. This increases the probability of a capable unit
being in the vicinity of a reported datum and giving the potential target little or no
time to evade.
g) Integrated weapon and sensor platforms. This extends the last principle to tar-
get destruction. It is optimal for the same platform that localizes the threat to be ca-
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pable of classification and destruction. This avoids potential time delays and
communication failures associated with calling in an attack.
h) Large area search capabilities on a continuous basis. The capability to con-
duct continuous search of large areas is required to gain initial detection on possible
targets. The system conducting the search must then be capable of providing a real
time datum to a platform capable of target localization, classification, and destruc-
tion,
i) Base watch and choke point tactics. Intelligence effort focused on the locating
and subsequent watching of launcher storage bases is vital to determine weapon
mobilization and estimating enemy order of battle. A choke point can be thought of
as an easily searched area where a target should pass through, usually due to geo-
graphic constraints, to get from point A to point B. For mobile launchers, this defi-
nition is simply extended to include paths of least resistance; highways and bridges,
for example.
j) Tracking of all known threats at all times. Once a mobile launcher is detected
and classified, there must be the capability to continue tracking until either hostili-
ties erupt and it can be destroyed or it is no longer considered a threat.
k) Well exercised, coordinated prosecution. An optimal counter effort must com-
bine the capabilities of all services as well as those of our Allies. Joint and NATO
exercises are required to ensure all participants involved with the effort are in con-
cert with each other.
1) Quick and successful response to reported datum. This encompasses many of
the above principles. Once intelligence is received on a possible target, a capable
platform must arrive expeditiously at datum and perform effective localization.
The mobile SRBM counter effort is still in its infancy. It should be thought of in broad terms,
not simply as a science and/or engineering problem. The effort, like ASW, is multi-faceted and will
need a broad array of disciplines including tactical modeling, risk analysis and decision modeling
in addition to science and engineering. The general principles of ASW should be used as a basic
structure, or guideline, to ensure the effort is focused in the direction to optimally counter the
threat.
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Many of the principles listed in this section involve or imply the prosecution of mobile launch-
ers prior to receiving cuing data from a missile launch. Chapter 3 argues that attack operations in
TMD will entail use of the various services in joint operations. Chapter 4 points out the benefits to
be gained through the inclusion of both pre-launch search tactics and pre-hostility intelligence in
the mobile launcher counter effort doctrine through the analysis of a circulation model.
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3: A Joint Idea: An ASW Approach to TMD^
James J. Wirtz
3.1 Introduction
During the Gulf War, it became increasingly apparent that U.S. forces had failed to destroy
Iraqi SCUDs on the ground before they could be launched against targets in Israel and Saudi Ara-
bia. Despite the large number of air sorties devoted to eliminating the SCUD threat, the "flaming
datum," used to target mobile missile launchers proved ineffective. Even though aircraft arrived in
the general vicinity of a missile site only a few minutes after a missile launch, SCUD crews had
plenty of time to "scoot" to predetermined hiding areas before U.S. warplanes arrived overhead.
Since the Gulf conflict, improving the ability of American units to defend themselves against
ballistic missiles has remained a priority. The Clinton administration's counterproliferation policy
emphasizes Theater Missile Defense (TMD), especially defense against missiles armed with
Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD).' The administration has concentrated on developing active
defenses, for example upgrading the Army's Patriot missile system, and improving command, con-
trol, communications and intelligence (C3I) to counter the regional missile threat.^ Still, improved
active defenses and C3I are only two facets of effective TMD. To succeed, TMD requires both pas-
sive defenses and a counterforce capability. Somehow, the services must improve the perfor-
mance turned in against Iraqi SCUDs during the Gulf War by integrating the four major elements
ofTMD ~ C3I, active defenses, passive defense and counterforce ~ into an overall campaign strat-
egy-
Many political issues complicate counterproliferation and TMD.'* Devising a joint approach to
C3I and multi-service air, ground and naval operations, however, poses its own unique set of mil-
itary problems. In terms of organization and doctrine, TMD is difficult because it is "inherently a
joint mission." As the authors of JP3-01 .5 "Doctrine for Joint Theater Missile Defense" note, "joint
force components, supporting CINCs, and multinational force TMD capabilities must be integrated
1. This paper is published in Ref. [8]. The sources referred to in this paper are included as Endnotes at the
end of the paper.
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toward the common objective of neutralizing or destroying the enemy's Theater Missile capabili-
ty."^ Accomplishing this integration, however, is no small task. New hardware, software or a single
new weapon will not miraculously solve the TMD problem. What is needed is a "better idea" for
organizing multiservice C3I, active defenses, passive defense and counterforce into an effective
TMD strategy.
If one is willing to look for this organizing principle in unexpected places, then a tried and true
method of destroying targets that rely on mobility and stealth to improve their survivability already
exists: Anti-Submarine Warfare (ASW). As strange as it may sound, a TMD architecture based on
an ASW philosophy offers a way to integrate the services' various capabilities into a coherent plan
to stop an opponent's ballistic missiles from reaching their targets. Applying ASW principles to
TMD also represents a novel development in joint warfare. Joint strategy can be achieved by using
one service's approach to solving a specific problem as an integrating principle in a multiservice
operation. In this case, an ASW approach allows each of the services to integrate what they do best
into an overall joint campaign.
To support this argument, the article briefly sketches the fundamentals ofASW operations and
applies them to the problem of locating and destroying mobile missiles before they can be
launched. It then explains why each of the services should play a role in a TMD strategy inspired
by ASW. It also suggests which CINC should take at least peacetime responsibility for promoting
the TMD effort. The article concludes with some observations about the role of ideas in joint war-
fare.
3.2 Anti-Submarine Warfare
At first glance, it would seem easier to find a needle in a hay stack than to locate a submarine
in the oceans' vast expanse. But, the U.S. Navy can detect, track, target and destroy submarines as
they operate in the open oceans. In theory, the same ASW philosophy used to organize and prose-
cute attacks against submarines should prove to be effective against missile launchers that also rely
on mobility and stealth to improve their pre-launch and post launch survivability.
ASW procedures are often divided into five categories: (1) continuous collection and analysis
of intelligence; (2) continuous monitoring of probable launch areas; (3) generation of cueing
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(warning) when specific platforms move to a launch status; (4) the localization of specific systems;
and (5) attack. Organized sequentially, each of these categories represents a stage in the ASW
search and attack effort. As one moves from stage one to stage five not only does the area searched
become increasingly restricted, but the time available to complete the task at hand becomes more
limited. These five stages could form the core elements of a multi-service, multi-mission ASW ap-
proach to counterforce strikes against theater ballistic missiles.
Information, critical to the entire counterforce effort, can be gained through sustained collec-
tion and analysis of data about all known mobile missiles, the first stage of the ASW process. In
tracking submarines, the opponent's inventory is followed by hull number; similar efforts would
have to be made to track individual missile Transporter-Erector-Launchers (TELs). Missile pro-
duction, storage and repair centers would have to be monitored to generate this order-of-battle in-
telligence; this fundamental intelligence work probably would provide the added benefit of
uncovering clandestine installations in the opponents fixed missile infrastructure. This should pro-
duce information about the overall size, day-to-day readiness, and surge (alert-generation) capabil-
ity of the opponent's systems. Training cycles, exercises, support vehicle activity, base egress and
ingress and movement through "choke points" (well-maintained roads, heavy duty bridges, rail
heads) would also be monitored. These efforts should yield a useful estimate of the general location
of the opponent's mobile missiles, creating a baseline to assess deviation in the opponent's standard
operating procedures. In effect, stage one creates an indications and warning baseline.
Surveillance of all probable launch areas, the second step in the ASW process, depends upon
intelligence gathered about the opponent's overall missile capability: indications of when and
where to look for mobile missiles are produced in stage one analyses. In stage two operations, vi-
sual signatures of areas of interest would be compared on a regular basis to look for changes (dam-
age to plants, tire tracks or the presence of the weapons systems themselves). Similarly, acoustic,
seismic, radar and communication signatures could be compared over time. Of special importance
would be "life-support events," the logistical tail that could lead directly to a TEL in the field. Spe-
cial attention would be paid to likely operating areas and negative search information (indications
that terrain features make certain areas unsuitable for SCUD operations) would be used to develop
an operating history of the opponent's TELs. Armed with this information, real-time "tracks" of
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fielded TELs could be monitored as long as possible; thus, a working knowledge of the location of
all TELs in or near launch areas could be maintained.
Cueing, the third step in the ASW process, is characterized by intensive efforts to develop a
more accurate and detailed track of a specific weapons system. It typically results when a TEL is
detected in a launch area or when changes in activities or activity levels indicate that preparations
are underway for an actual missile launch. This intelligence could come from a variety of sources.
Stage one analyses might yield indications of changes in activity or the general location of a spe-
cific system. Stage two surveillance also might detect communication, acoustic or radiation signa-
tures as TELs are made ready to fire. Cueing, however, is best viewed as a transitional step in
counterforce efforts against mobile missiles: it is related to a decision by either U.S. authorities or
the opponent to move to a war footing. Cueing is intended to establish a detailed track of a potential
target, information that would allow for the quick prosecution of an attack.
The decision to engage in the localization (identification of the target's precise location) of cued
TELs, the fourth stage of the counterforce operation, will likely be made by the National Command
Authority. Although search activities related to cueing might require overflights of an opponent's
territory, localization will require armed aircraft or unmanned airborne vehicles to enter an oppo-
nent's airspace, an act of war. Piloted aircraft working to localize an opponent's TELs should pos-
sess a defense suppression capability. Localization begins from a starting point identified by
intelligence collected and analyzed from the proceeding three stages of the ASW process; because
of the short ranges involved, a wide variety of sensors can then be used to generate timely and de-
tailed tracks of the target. Coordination of the platforms involved and fusion (receiving, analyzing
and displaying) of the data produced by a variety of sensors plays a crucial role in localizing the
target.
Over the years, the Navy also has discovered that practice facilitates localization efforts. The
Navy was fortunate because the Soviets had for years provided opportunities to localize real targets
on the open ocean. In other words, officers and policymakers cannot expect that the skills, experi-
ence, hardware and communication architectures (fusion) necessary to localize a target can be im-
provised at a moment's notice.^
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The final step in the ASW process is to attack the target. Ideally, the attacking weapons system
would have its own localization sensor. The Navy never carried out this final step during the Cold
War, but exercises revealed that coordination and practice increased the likelihood of successful
attacks. It would also be important following an attack to verify that the opponent's weapons sys-
tem had been destroyed: crippled systems could be repaired and subsequently fired. This would be
especially important if the mobile missiles under attack were armed with WMD. Ground forces
would have to be inserted, deep behind enemy lines, to survey damaged sites or launch vehicles.
These forces should be instructed to secure and remove intact warheads or to assess the extent of
biological, chemical or nuclear hazards created by successful counterforce strikes. Even though
damaged warheads and delivery systems are not militarily valuable, the hazardous materials they
contain would still be valuable to terrorists or to enterprising criminals interested in making wind-
fall profits on the black market. Indeed, given the extreme political sensitivity created by the threat
ofWMD attack, American political leaders will probably expect total certainty when it comes to
damage assessments ofWMD sites, the kind of certainty that has historically required the presence
of ground forces.^
In sum, several aspects of an ASW approach to counterforce make it attractive as a framework
for the destruction of TELs before missile launch. An ASW approach calls for continuous moni-
toring of the status and activities of an opponent's military forces. This would not only build order-
of-battle and infrastructure intelligence, but it would also provide a basis for indications and warn-
ing estimates. An ASW approach also increases the defensive problem confronted by the opponent.
Instead of counting on the ability to "shoot and scoot," opponents would have to assume that their
forces are being hunted. In a situation when every stray electronic, seismic or acoustic emission
might be used to attack a TEL, missile crews might become preoccupied with the defensive task
of protecting their missiles. They might not be able to fire with the "hunters" on their trail. More-
over, because it does not rely on "flaming datum," an actual missile firing, to locate an opponent's
weapon, an ASW inspired strategy probably is the most effective approach to counterforce. It is
the only strategy that suggests that it is possible to locate and to destroy missiles after they have
moved to the field but before they can be fired.^
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3.3 TMD as Joint Warfare
It is unlikely that any one service could successfully undertake all four elements — C3I, active
defenses, passive defense and counterforce — embodied in Theater Missile Defense. To succeed,
an ASW approach to TMD would have to draw on the resources available within the entire U.S.
defense and intelligence community. Indeed, the ASW approach to counterforce highlights the fact
that TMD is primarily an exercise in peacetime intelligence gathering and analysis. Existing joint
doctrine also acknowledges the important role played by national assets used by USSPACECOM,
for example, in a joint TMD campaign.^ An ASW approach, however, could help guide this peace-
time collection and analysis by developing a highly specific set of intelligence requirements. New
sensors also could be developed to facilitate day-to-day monitoring of potential opponents' mobile
missile operations. Most importantly, work could begin to improve C3I between national intelli-
gence resources and the service components that will need real-time intelligence to engage in the
hunt for mobile missiles.
Each of the services also has a special role to play in an ASW approach to TMD. Air Force
officers, given their expertise in the conduct of strategic bombardment, should be given responsi-
bility for identifying and targeting the infrastructure that supports an opponent's mobile missile op-
erations. To eliminate the possibility of sustained operations, the Air Force should work to destroy
the logistical and industrial tail that supports an opponent's deployed missile force. Air Force ex-
perience in managing an overall air campaign also would suggest that they are the service of choice
to tackle the C3I and resource allocation problems inherent in a massive TMD effort.
Naval officers have more than just expertise in ASW operations to contribute to TMD. Unlike
their Air Force counterparts, naval aviators tend not to think in terms of strategic bombardment,
but in terms of destroying specific military targets. The Navy should be given the mission of de-
stroying missiles that have already been deployed. Because the Navy's Aegis system will soon pos-
sess limited capabilities against ballistic missiles, a Navy carrier battle-group also might serve as
a sort of "emergency" TMD force. Naval aviation could conduct counterforce strikes against a few
particularly threatening offensive systems while Aegis-equipped ships protect high-value coastal
targets.
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As the service operating the only demonstrated active defense ~ the Patriot missile system ~
against ballistic missiles, the Army has an obvious role to play in TMD. Others have been quick to
identify the Army's Tactical Missile system, with a forty-kilometer range and antipersonnel/anti-
material submunitions, and the Apache attack helicopter, with a range in excess of 200 kilometers,
as ideal counterforce weapons.'^ Less obvious, however, is the important role that ground forces
play in an ASW approach to TMD. Ground forces, especially special forces, would prefer to exer-
cise their ability to target and destroy installations and weapons deep behind enemy lines. But their
greatest contribution to the TMD effort probably will take the less glamourous form of "policing
the battlefield." In other words, ground forces will probably be required to conduct a whole host of
operations after suspected missile sites have been subjected to attack. Small teams could guarantee
that launchers and missiles damaged by air strikes were not just rendered temporarily inoperable
by air attacks but were in fact destroyed. Primitive storage bunkers, difficult to identify from the
air, might also be located by ground forces that quickly survey a damaged missile site. Most im-
portantly, WMD warheads, already married to missiles or forward deployed near missile sites, will
have to be secured. Even if launchers or missiles have been destroyed by air attack, operable war-
heads might still be used by an opponent or find their way onto the black market. U.S. forces would
also benefit from a quick assessment of the chemical or radioactive hazard created by damaged
warheads following a successful counterforce attack.
Who should be in charge of aTMD campaign influenced by an ASW philosophy? Several con-
siderations shape the answer to this question. First, TMD is largely a peacetime intelligence activ-
ity. Second, TMD requires continuous coordination of offensive and defensive capabilities
possessed by all the services. Third, the demand for TMD is not confined to a particular part of the
globe. Regional CINCs must plan for TMD, but it might be more efficient if a separate command
prepares TMD packages of multiservice C3I, active defense, passive defense and counterforce ca-
pabilities for insertion into a region.
Given these considerations, U.S. Strategic Command (STRATCOM) would be a good choice
to head a TMD campaign. STRATCOM's Project "Silver Book," a peacetime effort to compile a
TMD counterforce target list, could serve as an initial step in an ASW-inspired TMD strategy.''
In its former incarnation as the Strategic Air Command, STRATCOM also has much experience
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in planning massive multiservice air campaigns which relied in part on real-time and national-level
intelligence collection and analysis.'^ Alternately headed by Air Force and Naval officers,
STRATCOM also brings together a unique combination of talents needed to make a TMD strategy
based on ASW principles a reality: a history of planning joint counterforce attacks; an emphasis on
large air operations; great familiarity with ASW; sustained intelligence gathering and real-time in-
telligence collection and assessment; a familiarity with special-forces operations againstWMD tar-
gets; and a tradition as the primary command for U.S. nuclear operations.
3.4 Ideas and Joint Warfare
When applied to the problem of Theater Missile Defense, an ASW-philosophy provides a uni-
fying idea that identifies goals and specifies tasks. It also supplies all concerned with an image of
an entire process, based on extensive Navy experience, that can be used to evaluate how specific
single-service initiatives might contribute to an overall TMD campaign. For those interested in ful-
filling the scores of interrelated tasks identified in Doctrine for Joint Theater Missile Defense, the
idea of ASW might supply a "point of departure": it specifies how one could begin to organize ef-
fective multiservice TMD with existing capabilities. In a sense, an ASW philosophy, borrowing a
term from the philosophy of science, could serve as a "paradigm" for TMD: it identifies key prob-
lems that are in need of a solution; it specifies how one should proceed to overcome these key stum-
bling blocks; it allocates responsibility for solving specific parts of the problem; and it explains
how the achievement of specific small tasks can produce a synergy that overcomes an extraordi-
narily complex problem.'^
As a paradigm for TMD, however, anti-submarine warfare does suffer from a serious draw-
back: the term is forever linked to the Navy as one of its traditional, and quite important, mission
areas. During the Cold War, a suggestion that one service possessed the key to American security
was likely to provoke an outburst of interservice rivalry. Occasionally, a service endorsed an idea
advanced by another to capitalize on political interest in a "war-winning" strategy or capability,
but this tactic often backfired. The Navy's grudging recognition of the importance of "strategic
bombardment" during the B-36 debate, for example, did not save their "super carrier."'"^ Thus, an
ASW approach to TMD might be misconstrued as an effort to develop a "single service strategy,"
a strategy that purportedly allows one service to single handedly win the next war.'^
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Unlike single service doctrines, however, an ASW philosophy is not an exclusionary paradigm.
Much like the way the old Maritime Strategy organized all of the forces available to the Navy into
a coherent campaign in the event of war along the Central Front, an ASW-philosophy also allows
each of the services to contribute what they do best to solving the problem of Theater Missile De-
fense.'^ At its core, an ASW approach to TMD is a "joint strategy": its central tenet is that only by
working together can the services defend U.S. allies or U.S. forces stationed overseas from the mo-
bile missile threat.
Still, it would be a mistake to underestimate the impact of interservice and intraservice rivalry,
despite renewed congressional emphasis on fostering joint responses to security threats. STRAT-
COM's Project Silverbook, for instance, has been superseded by a new initiative. The Theater
Planning Support Document. Project Silverbook was abandoned apparently after other CINCs ob-
jected to what they perceived as STRATCOM's effort to monopolize planning for counterforce
strikes in support of TMD. At a time of shrinking or stable budgets, any effort to prompt a joint
and, in this case, a potentially consolidated effort, is likely to meet with great resistance from some
quarter of the defense establishment.
3.5 Conclusion
By adopting an ASW paradigm for TMD, the services would be embarking on a new form of
joint warfare. Instead of reinventing the wheel, an idea used effectively by one service could be
borrowed to address a complex multiservice problem. Indeed, breaking the taboo against borrow-
ing ideas used by other services opens a whole range of possibilities. The danger always exists that
some might choose to mimic blindly the capabilities possessed by other services, even though the
size of post-Cold War defense budgets probably would greatly reduce the effectiveness of this bud-
getary tactic. But, just because an idea originates in one service does not mean that it forever must
be banished from the effort to foster joint strategy.
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4: Quantifying Attack Operations And Active Defense
Kneale T. Marshall
4.1 Introduction
Chapter 2 (see also Reference [6]) contains a discussion of the similarities between theater bal-
listic missile (TBM) defense and anti-submarine warfare (ASW). Both missions require searching,
detecting, localizing, classifying, and finally attacking the object of interest. A great deal has been
learned over the past fifty years on how to accomplish a successful ASW mission, and many of
lessons learned are pertinent to combatting TBMs. Notice that ASW was never referred as torpedo
defense. Attempts were not made to kill the torpedo in the water; efforts were always concentrated
on going after the launcher (the submarine) or the infrastructure necessary for it to operate. The
purpose of this paper is to present and analyze a mathematical model ofTBM launcher and missile
flight operations so that comparisons can be made of the effectiveness of various strategies to
counter the threat. The model presented here extends the earlier analysis and results found in
Reference [6].
Figure 4.1 shows a schematic of the operations of a TBM launcher and the missile assumed in
this report. Launchers are expected to be stored in some fixed storage area. When hostilities are
about to commence the launchers will move to a forward area for assembly, fueling and mating
with the missiles. From there a launcher will move to its launch area, and after launch will return
to the forward area to prepare for the next launch. We assume that each launcher has the potential
to launch m missiles, after which it must be taken out of service for an extended time. The reason
could be that it must undergo extensive repair and refit, or it could run out of missiles. We also
assume that each missile has w (>1) warheads.
In this paper we assume that there are five phases in the TBM operation when the missile sys-
tem could be attacked. These are
(a) Attack operations
1 . Attack of the launcher with mated missile before launch between assembly area
and launch site.^
1. This paper is published in Ref. [7].
2. It is understood that a launcher may employ a number of tactics on its way to or from the launch site, such
as stopping in hide sites. The model summarizes the effects of these strategies in a single survival or kill prob-
ability.
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2. Attack of the launcher after missile launch either at the launch site or on return to
assembly area.
(b) Active Defense
3. Attack of the missile during the boost phase,
4. Attack the missile on reentry before multiple warheads separate,
5. Attack each warhead in the terminal phase.
FIXED STORAGE/
Figure 4.1: Schematic of Theater Ballistic Missile Operations
The effectiveness of attacking the system in each of these five phases is assume to be summa-
rized by a kill probability ^, for the i-th phase, or equivalently by a survival probability ^„ where
^,
= 1 - p,. Although it is more usual to formulate a model in terms of kill probabilities, survival
probabilities are used because of the simplification that results in model development and presen-
tation of results. Our objectives are to find the probability distribution, mean, and variance of the
number of warheads reaching the target area from each launcher, and the expected number of
weapons required in each phase, in terms of the maximum number missiles per launcher (m), the
number of warheads per missile (n) and the five survival probabilities for the five phases as shown
in Figure 4. 1 . Using expressions for these quantities, we compare the effect of changing the model







almost surely be a necessary part of a layered defense system; without at least a modest success
rate in prosecuting the launchers effective active defense may not be feasible.
4.2 The Anti-TBM Model
We build the mathematical model in stages following the missile's path from being mounted
on the launcher to its or its launcher's destruction, or the arrival of its warheads in the target area.
First we develop the probability distribution, mean and variance of the number of missiles that are
successfully launched from a given launcher. These clearly depend on the attack operations effort
against the launcher. Next we derive the probability distribution, mean and variance of the number
of missiles that survive the boost and reentry phases. Finally we find expressions for the probability
distribution, mean and variance of the number of warheads that survive the final phase. The distri-
bution of the warheads surviving to reach the target area is a complex mixture of binomial proba-
bilities. The section ends with numerical examples to illustrate the results. A detailed analysis
using the model is presented in the next section.
4.2.1 Launcher Movement Phases
Let X be the number of missiles launched from a given launcher before it is either destroyed or
has launched m missiles. We assume independent attacks each time the launcher attempts an out-
ward journey to the launch site, and similarly for each time it attempts an return journey to reload.
Thus X is a random variable that can take on any integer value from (the launcher is destroyed
on the first outward journey) to m (all attempts to destroy the launcher fail). Note that X > / if and
only if the launcher survives the first outward journey, and then survives / succeeding cycles back







The expected value ofX is found by summing this cumulative tail distribution,
E[X] = l^qM^qj) = ^ ^ . . (4.1)
I =
This equation holds if both < <?! < 1 and < ^2 < equal to m when both and ^2 are
equal to 1 (zero effect in killing the launcher before or after launch).
To find its variance we need to find its second moment. For a non-negative integer-valued ran-
dom variable, say A^, it is easy to show that




rrv2i 2^i(^,^2)[l -'"(^1^2)'""' 0(^1^2)'"] , -(^l^2r)E[X ] = -I- —-— — . (4.2)
(l-(^,^2)) l-(^.^2)
This holds when both < (71 < 1 and < ^2 < ^ • When both qi and qj are equal to 1 , E[X^] = m^.
We find the variance of X in the usual way by subtracting the square of Equation (4.1) from
Equation (4.2).
We now turn to finding the expected number of weapons required in the first two phases. Be-
fore attempting to do this it is necessary to make two important assumptions that are assumed to
hold in all five phases. First, we assume that every time there is an opportunity to attack the launch-
er, the missile, or one of its warheads, this opportunity is taken and prosecuted with a single weap-
on. It may be that in practice more than one weapon is used, so that the numbers determined by the
model in this report can be thought of as lower bounds. Second, the extreme case of some kill prob-
ability being zero in a given phase can be obtained in one of two ways, either (i) by not attempting
an attack during that phase, or (ii) by attacking with a completely ineffective weapon system. In
this paper we assume that the first of these is true; any time we use a of zero (q^ of one) in phase
/ we assume no weapons are expended in phase /. The expected numbers of weapons required
should not be interpreted as estimates of weapons requirements in actual operations. In this paper
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they are intended as an aid in gaining insight when comparing the effectiveness of changing kill
probabilities in the various phases.
Let M^BL be the numbers of weapons used in the "before launch" and "after launch"
phases respectively against the launcher. Notice that if no missiles are launched, is zero (the
launcher was destroyed on its first outward journey). It is easy to show that no matter how many
missiles are launched from a given launcher, W^^i^ = X and its first two moments are given by Equa-
tions (4.1) and (4.2).
By following the cycle of the launcher one can see that the cumulative tail distribution of
is given by
Pr{ M^BL > } = (gigiY if / = 0, 1 , 2, . . . , (m- 1 ),
= Oif / > m.
Thus,
and by comparing this with Equation (4.1) we see that
E[WsJ=E[X]/q,. (4.3)
As our analysis progresses through the boost and reentry phases, expressions are found that re-
quire the probability mass function (pmQ of X. From the cumulative tail distribution above this is
seen to be
Px(i) = q\0 -^1^2X^192)"' 1,2, ...,m-l, (4.4)
The Boost and Reentry Phases
The boost phase and reentry phase survival probabilities are q-^ and q^ respectively (see
Figure 4.1). Let the number of missiles surviving both of these phases (per launcher) be Y. Clearly
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this is also a random variable, and if we assume that the attempt to shoot down a given missile in
either phase is independent of the outcomes of earlier or later attempts at other missiles, the con-
ditional random variable [Y\X] has a binomial distribution with parameters X and q^q^. Thus
E[Y\X] = X^3<74 and Var[yiX] = Xq^q^il - q^q^). By unconditioning on X, the expected number of
warheads surviving the reentry phase is
E[Y] = q,q,E[X] (4.5)
where E[X] is given by Equation (4.1). The variance of Y is found using the standard conditional
variance argument,
Var[Y] = Ex[Var[Y\X]] + Varx[E[Y\X]],
so
Var[Y] = q,q, (1 - q,qdE[X] + {q,q,fVar[X], (4.6)
where Equations (4.1) and (4.2) are used to find Var[X].
To find the pmf of Y, note that
Pnxii^i) = i, q^q^)
where <7 < /, < q-^q^ < 1 , and b{j;i, p) = {^jjp^i ^ - P)' ~^ .Unconditioning on X we find
m
PyU) = ^b{iJ,q3^4)Px(0 ' 7 = 0, 1,2, (4.7)
' = j
where the PxCO's are given in Equation (4.4).
Let and Wf^ be the number of weapons used in the boost and reentry phases respectively
against the missiles from a given launcher, and assume that exactly one weapon is used against
each in each phase. IfX survive launch, Wq = X and is a binomial random variable with param-
eters X and qy Thus E[Wb] = E[X], and E[VVr] = ^3E[X].
The Final Phase
In the final phase the probability that a given warhead survives an attack is
^5. Again we assume
independence among all attempts to destroy incoming warheads. Let the number of warheads sur-
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viving the final phase from the i-th incoming missile be Z,, / = 1, 2, K. Each Z, is a binomial
random variable with parameters n and q^, so £"[ZJ = nq^; and Var{Z,] = nq^(\-q^). Let the number
of warheads surviving the final phase (per launcher) be H, so
I = I
Conditioning on Y, E[H\Y] = nYq^ and Var[H\Y] = YVar\Z^ - nYq^{]-q<,). Unconditioning,
E[H] = nq,E[Y] (4.8)
and
Var[H] = nqs(\-q5)E[Y] + n^q^'^VarlY], (4.9)
where E[Y] and VarfF] are given by Equations (4.5) and (4.6) respectively.
The pmf of H, Pnik), is found in a similar way by first conditioning on F. If 7 = (no missiles
survive through the reentry phase) no warheads can reach the target area, so /7,/|y{OIOj = 1. If
Y = j > 0, H is the sum ofj identically distributed binomials so that PH\Af^ I j) = Kk', nj, q^).
Unconditioning,
m
Pnik) = 21 /?(/:;«;, ^5)PkO) ,^ = 0, 1,2, ...,m/z, (4.10)
where the pyiiY^ are given in Equation (4.7).
Let Wp be the number of weapons used in the final phase. If K missiles survive the reentry phase
and each carries n warheads, then Wp = nY. Thus the results on F can be used to calculate the mea-
sures of interest on Wp.
Figure 4.2 demonstrates the model by showing the cumulative tail distribution of H for three
different sets of survival probabilities. For all three cases the number of missiles per launcher (m)
is 20, and the number of warheads per missile (n) is 10. The right-most curve is obtained using no
(or completely ineffective) counter force (^, = ^2 = 0. boost and reentry survival probabilities (q^
and ^4) of 0.7, and a final phase warhead survival probability (^5) of 0.4. The center curve is ob-
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tained by decreasing and ^4 from 0.7 to 0.6, and from 0.4 to 0.3. The left-most curve is ob-
tained using the original set of parameters but decreasing both q^ and qj from 1 to 0.9. Clearly a
modest increase in kill probability in attack operations from to 0. 1 has a dramatic effect on the
number of warheads reaching the target area. An increase in kill probability from to 0.1 in the
5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40 45 50 55 60 65 70 75 80
Warheads Reaching Target Area
Figure 4.2: Cumulative Tail Distributions of Warheads Reaching Target Area
two phases of the launcher shows a drop in the 10-th percentile from 52 warheads to 23, compared
to a drop from 53 to 3 1 for a similar increase in kill probability in the boost, reentry and final phas-
es. Another way to interpret the three curves is to note that the chance of at most 20 warheads ( 1 0%
of a potential of 200) reaching the target area is 3% for the base case. With a given improvement
in active defense this increases to 46%, but if that improvement were made in attack operations
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instead of active defense it would increase to 87%. These numbers are shown in Column 2 of
Table 4. 1 . Columns 3 through 6 show the expected number of weapons used in each phase. A small
Case Pr[H<2Q} Em Em
q\ = qi = 1. ^3 = 94 = 0.7, ^5 = 0.4 0.03 20 14 98
9l = 92 = 1. ^3 = ^4 = 0.6, ^5 = 0.3 0.46 20 12 72
9, = ^3 = 0.9. ^3 = 94 = 0.7, ^5 =0.4 0.87 5.2 4.7 4.7 3.3 23
Table 4.1: Sample Output for Numerical Example
improvement in attack operations effectiveness sharply decreases the expected number of weapons
required for active defense. Note that the zero entries in columns 3 and 4 result from the assumption
that when <y, = ^2 = 1, it is assumed that no attack operations is attempted.
The next section contains a more detailed analysis of the model as parameter values are varied.
4.3 Model Analysis
Throughout this section results are demonstrated using kill probabilities /?, through rather
than survival probabilities, where /?, = !- We refer to a kill probability vector which is defined
to be (p,, P2,P3,P4, Ps)- For example (0, 0.2, 0.3, 0.5, 0.6) represents no chance of killing the
launcher in its outward journey to the launch site, a 20% chance of kill on its return journey to re-
load, a 30% chance of killing the missile in its boost phase, a 50% chance in its reentry phase, and
a 60% chance of killing each warhead in the final phase.
Theater anti-missile defense today consists primarily of the use of the PATRIOT system in the
final phase. The navy Aegis ship anti-missile defense system is currently being considered for
modification for the reentry phase of the anti-TBM mission, and the army is developing the
THAAD (theater high altitude air defense) system for this same phase. The air force is currently
developing boost phase systems. Although some work has been done on detecting and destroying
launchers prior to or after a launch, operational experience in Desert Storm showed that current
systems and operational doctrine are ineffective. This current state can be modeled by setting p^,
P2, Pj and p4 all equal to 0, We can set p^ at some value depending on how well one believes the
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PATRIOT works. As a base case by which to measure possible system improvement we set to
0.7. Thus
Base Case Kill Probability Vector = (0, 0, 0, 0, 0.7). (4.1 1)
Also as a base case we assume that a launcher can launch at most 20 missiles before requiring ma-
jor overhaul, or before it runs out of missiles, so m = 20.
We look at three measures of effectiveness for the (random) number of warheads arriving in
the target area, H. These are (i) the mean E[H], (ii) the median, or that value h such that
Pr[H<h] = 0.5, and (iii) the ninetieth percentile, or that value h such that Pr{H<h] = 0.90. We also
look at the expected number of active defense weapons required (£'[Wb]' ^[^r]' and ^^[Wf])'
the expected number of attack operations weapons (^'[Wc])- We first look at today's case where
there is only one warhead per missile {n= 1 ), and show how some performance measures are af-
fected by improving kill probabilities in each of the first four phases. This is followed by a similar
analysis when multiple warheads are considered.
4.3.1 Single Warhead Analysis
The mean numbers of warheads (and hence missiles since we are assuming one warhead per
missile) that arrive in the target area shown plotted in Figure 4.3 as a function of the kill probability
at a particular stage. The figure contains three curves. All three start at the same point (0,6) because
the expected number of warheads reaching the target area, E[H], is 6 when m = 20, n = 1, the base
case probabilities are given in (4. 1 1 ), and Equations (4. 1 ), (4.5), and (4.8) are used. We investigate
the effect on E[H] of increasing each of the four zero kill probabilities in (4.1 1) one at a time.
The upper curve is found by increasing the kill probability of either the boost (p^) or reentry
(p^) phase from its base value of up to 0.8. In either case it decreases linearly with a slope of -6.
The middle and lower curves are obtained by increasing pj and pi respectively over the same range.
The difference in the effect of a small increase in kill probability in the attack operations phases
when compared to the active defense stages is dramatic; an increase from to 0. 1 in either to boost
or reentry phases reduces E[H] from 6 to 5.4, whereas this same increase in the either of the attack
operations stages reduces it from 6 to approximately 2.5. This significant improvement is caused
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Figure 4.3: Mean Number of Warheads Reaching Target
geometric reduction in E[H]. In the active defense stages a kill results in the destruction of only
one missile. The small improvement in increasing rather than pj is caused by the fact that keep-
ing at zero means the first missile from a launcher will be launched for certain, whereas increas-
ing gives a chance to destroy the launcher before its first missile flies.
Figure 4.4 contains a similar analysis using the median number of warheads reaching the target
area rather than the mean. Similar results are found. For the base case the median of H is 5.4. In-
creasing the boost or reentry kill probabilities from to 0.1 reduces this to 4.8, whereas this in-
crease in /?! or p2 reduces it to 1.3 and 1.6 respectively. In other words, using a kill probability
vector (0.1, 0, 0, 0, 0.7) there is a fifty percent chance that fewer than 1.3 warheads will reach the
target area, whereas using (0, 0, 0, 0.1, 0.7) or (0, 0, 0.1, 0, 0.7) this number is 4.8.
Figure 4.5 contains a similar analysis using the ninetieth percentile of the number of warheads
reaching the target. For the base case there is a ninety percent chance that the number of warheads
reaching the target area from a given launcher is no more than 8.2. Increasing the boost or reentry




Figure 4.4: Median Number of Warheads Reaching Target
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duces it to 5.5 or 5.7 respectively. Although by using this measure of effectiveness there is less of
a difference between improving attack operations and active defense, the difference is still signif-
icant.
We now turn to measuring the effects of changing kill probabilities on the expected numbers
of weapons used in each phase. Starting from the base case we assume that a zero kill probability
in a given phase indicates that no attempt is being made to kill the launcher or missile in that phase.





(0, 0, 0, 0, 0.7)-Base Case 20 0.70
(0, 0, 0, 0.2, 0.7) 20 16 0.42
(0, 0, 0.2, 0, 0.7) 20 16 0.42
(0, 0.2, 0, 0, 0.7) 4.94 4.94 1.88
(0.2, 0, 0, 0, 0.7) 4.94 3.95 2.11
Table 4.2: Effect of Increasing Kill Probabilities on Weapons Numbers and Effectiveness
expected number of weapons used per launcher when no attempt is made to destroy the missile be-
fore the final phase, and assuming one weapon for each warhead, is equal to the number of missiles
time warheads per missile that a launcher can launch. In this example that is 20. Also for the base
case the expected number of warhead kills per weapon is equal to the final phase kill probability
as should be expected. The remaining rows in Table 4.2 show the effect of increase the kill prob-
ability of each phase in turn from to 0.2. Note the dramatic drop in the requirement for weapons
in the final phase by having a modest effectiveness in attack operations versus the same effective-
ness in the boost or reentry phases. In those phases a modest kill probability significantly increases
the warhead kills/weapons used ratio.
Multiple Warhead Analysis
We repeat the analysis using the same base case kill probability vector shown in (4.1 1) and
twenty missiles per launcher (m = 20), but in this section we assume each missile carries ten war-
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heads (n = 10). The same types of results are illustrated in Figures 4.6, 4.7 and 4.8 as were seen in
Figures 4.3, 4.4 and 4.5. In fact since the mean is linear in n the curves in Figure 4.5 are the same
as those in Figure 4.3 except the vertical scale has changed by a factor of 10. There is no simple
relationship between the median or the ninetieth percentile and n, although over some of the range
of the kill probability the relationship appears to be approximately linear. For example, from
Figure 4.4 with n = 1 we see that a median number 2 for H (90% kill of the twenty possible war-
heads) can be achieved if pi or p2 are close to 0.08, whereas in the boost or reentry phases we would
or p4 to be 0.56 to achieve this success. From Figure 4.5 with /i = 10 we see that a median num-
ber 20 for H (90% kill of the two hundred possible warheads) can be achieved if ^j, or p2 are close
to 0.1, whereas in the boost or reentry phases we would p^^ or p^ to be 0.65. Similarly, from
Figure 4.5 we see that to achieve a ninetieth percentile of 2 when n = 1 requires either a pi or P2 of
about 0.28 or a p^ or p^ of 0.81; from Figure 4.5 a ninetieth percentile of 20 when n = 10 requires
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Figure 4.7: Median Number of Warheads Reaching Target, Ten Warheads per Missile
Table 4.3 shows the expected numbers of weapons required at each stage and the expected war-
head kills per weapon when n- 10. By comparing the results with those in Table 4.2 it is clear that
the required expected numbers of weapons at the attack operations, boost, or reentry phases does
not change when warheads per missile increase from 1 to 10, but the number of weapons in the
final stage increases by a factor of ten. These results should be expected since a successful kill at
any phase before the warheads separate is assume to kill all n warheads. Note that the expected
number of warheads killed per weapon increases significantly as n increases the earlier one can at-
tack the TBM operation. In other words, attack operations is increasingly effective as the number
of warheads carried by the missile increases.
4.4 Normal Approximations
For given values of m, n, and a kill probability vector, it is easy to calculate the expected value
of //using Equations (4.1), (4.5), and (4.8); likewise one can easily find the variance using Equa-
tions (4.1), (4.2), (4.5), (4.6), and (4.9). But to find percentiles such as the median or the ninetieth
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Figure 4.8: Ninetieth Percentile of Warheads Reaching Target, Ten Warheads per Missile




(0, 0, 0, 0, 0.7)-Base Case 200 0.70
(0, 0, 0, 0.2, 0.7) 20 160 0.84
(0, 0, 0.2, 0, 0.7) 20 160 0.84
(0, 0.2, 0, 0, 0.7) 4.94 49.4 3.41
(0.2, 0, 0, 0, 0.7) 4.94 39.5 4.23
Table 4.3: Expected Weapons Numbers and Effectiveness with Ten Warheads per Missile
tions (4.4), (4.7), and (4.10). These equations were used to find the curves in Figures 4.2, 4.4, 4.5,
4.7, and 4.8. Recall that H is not a simple sum of independent random variables, but results from
a complex set of five random events, the first two of which have a truncated geometric distribution,
the next two a conditional binomial distribution, and the last is a random sum of these weighted
binomials. Even so, one might suspect that its distribution is approximately normal for at least
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some range of the parameter values, in which case the percentiles can be estimated using only the
mean and variance of H. We investigate the appropriateness of a normal approximation for the me-
dian and ninetieth percentiles of H in this section.
Since the normal is a symmetric distribution its mean and median are equal. Table 4.4 contains
Kill Probability Vector
Ten Warheads per Missile
in= 10)








(0, 0, 0, 0, 0.7)-Base Case 59.3 60.0 5.4 6.0
(0, 0, 0, 0.2, 0.7)
or
(0, 0, 0.2, 0, 0.7)
47.6 48.0 4.2 4.8
(0, 0.2, 0, 0, 0.7) 10.3 14.8 0.6 1.5
(0.2, 0, 0, 0, 0.7) 7.1 11.9 0.2 1.2
(0.2, 0.2, 0.3, 0.5, 0.7) NA 2.3 NA 0.2
Table 4.4: Normal Approximation for the Median
actual medians and normal approximations for the base case and kill probability vectors used in the
previous sections, and an example that assumes positive kill probabilities in all five stages. The
normal approximation seems to perform reasonably well for the ten warhead case when there are
zero kill probabilities in the attack operations stages; it does less well in the single warhead case.
When and/or P2 are significantly larger than zero, the distribution ofH is highly skewed and the
normal approximation for the median is poor. The entries NA (not applicable) in the table indicate
that the probability that H is zero is larger than 0.5 so that no median value exists.
Figure 4.9 contains cumulative tail distributions (solid lines) and normal approximations
(dashed lines) for the kill probability vectors in Table 4.3 and one warhead per missile. For none
of the examples is the normal approximation close to the actual distribution except in the extreme
tails. It is particularly poor when there is a positive probability of kill by attack operations.
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Figure 4.9: Cumulative Tail Distributions and Normal Approximations, n = l
Figure 4.10 contains cumulative tail distributions (solid lines) and normal approximations
(dashed lines) for the kill probability vectors in Table 4.3 and ten warheads per missile. When there
is no attack operations the normal approximation is close to the actual distribution over the whole
range, but again there are significant differences when there is a positive probability of kill by at-
tack operations.
As one might expect the approximation does quite well when // is a fixed (non-random) sum
of binomial random variables. Since this number is considerably larger when multiple warheads
are present it does significantly better in this case. With positive attack operations probabilities the
truncated geometric distribution of the number of missiles launch leads to skewing of the distribu-
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Figure 4.10: Cumulative Tail Distributions and Normal Approximations, n =: 10
It is not recommended that the normal approximation be used for the median (or equivalently
that the median and mean be assumed to take on the same value). Nor is it recommended that it be
used as an approximation to the tail distribution unless multiple warheads are assumed to be
present and the only significant source of uncertainty is in the final stages of the TBM operation.
4.5 Conclusions
The model in this report shows that both attack operations and active defense will form essen-
tial parts of any future successful system for theater ballistic missile defense. Without attack oper-
ations it will be relatively easy for the enemy to overwhelm a feasible active defense system. A
system that can successfully destroy launchers and their crews will provide considerable leverage
in reducing the numbers of active defense weapons required; this leverage increases dramatically
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as the number of warheads on each missile increases. The model allows the calculation of percen-
tiles of the numbers of warheads destroyed rather than simple expected values.
Past experience in finding and destroying launchers has demonstrated little success in this ar-
eas, was discussed in Chapter 2, success will most likely require a far more structured approach
than has been used. A model for such a structure is that used in anti-submarine warfare where great
experience has been gained in the past fifty years at finding and destroying torpedo underwater
missile launchers. It is expected that successful attack operations against launchers on land will re-
quire efforts in cuing, search, detection, localization, classification and destruction. Current oper-
ations can be thought of as attempting to skip from cuing (for example, flaming datum information
after launch) to attack.
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5: Searching for Transient Objects along Roads
Kneale T. Marshall
5.1 Introduction
The Transporter-Erector-Launcher (TEL) is the vehicle used to deliver theater ballistic missiles
to their launch sites, set up and launch the missile, and return to a staging area for reloading. A TEL
repeats this cycle for further missile launches until it runs out of missiles, is taken out of service
for maintenance and repair, or is destroyed at some point in its cycle by attack operations. This pa-
per presents a model for determining the probability of detecting a TEL during the limited time it
is exposed during its reload/launch cycle, using an overhead aerial search platform that can monitor
vehicular traffic on or close to a road.
It is assumed that a search vehicle (referred to as the searcher) patrols a road segment continu-
ously; when it reaches one end of the road segment it reverses direction and repeats the search to
the other end, after which it repeats the process. In order to detect a target it is assumed that the
searcher must overfly the target during the period the target is exposed, and also must correctly
identify it as a target while flying over it. Since TELs typically travel short distances relative to the
length of road being patrolled we assume in this paper that the TEL remains essentially stationary
during the time it is exposed.
5.2 Overfly Probabilities
Let the length of the road be /, the (constant) speed of the searcher v, and the length of time the
TEL is exposed t. Let the fraction of the road that can be overflown during the TEL exposure time
be X, so
1 . This paper is based on concepts found in theses written by Vernon L. Junker and Paul A. Soutter.
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The quantity jc plays a major role in the analysis. Note that it takes on the value 1 only if the search-
er can overfly the entire road length once during the exposure time t. Accordingly x is referred to
as the coverage ratio.
Note that if x > 2 the searcher will certainly overfly the exposed TEL no matter what the rela-
tive positions along the road the searcher and the TEL are when the TEL exposure time starts. For
X < 2 it is possible that when the TEL exposure time starts, the TEL and searcher are located rela-
tive to each other in such a way that overflight by the searcher cannot occur. The purpose of this
section is to determine the probability distribution of the number of times the searcher overflies the
exposed TEL as a function of the coverage ratio x.
U (case 1) f/ (case 2) C/ (case 3)
1 T ^ V , T ,
(/ - vt) (/ - vt/2) I
Figure 5.11: Schematic of Road and Searcher Position when TEL appears
First consider the case where < jc < 1 (vt<l). Figure 5. 1 1 shows a schematic of the road for
this case. Assume that
Al: TEL exposure times occur as a stationary Poisson process,
A2: When TEL exposure occurs the TEL is located according to an independent sta-
tionary Poisson process along the road.
A3: The searcher patrols over the road at constant speed v.
These three assumptions imply that when a TEL exposes itself the position of the searcher and the
position of the TEL are independent random variables, each uniformly distributed over (0, /). A
further assumption is made that when TEL exposure starts the searcher is traveling from left to
right in Figure 5.1 1; since the problem is symmetric, this assumption causes no loss in generality.
Let U be the (uncertain) location of the searcher when TEL exposure occurs, measured from
the left end of the road. If U is in the interval (0, / - vt) it will overfly the TEL once only if the TEL's
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location is in the interval {U, U + vt). Note also that it can never overfly it twice when U is in this
interval. These observations do not hold if U is in either of the intervals (/ + vt,l + vt/2) or (/ + vt/2,
I ). Each interval must be considered separately.
Let p(i; x) be the probability the searcher overflies the TEL i times while it is exposed, given
the coverage ration / = 0, 1 , 2. To calculate this, first condition on the position of the searcher at
exposure time by letting U = u, and let p{i ; u, x) be this conditional probability.
Case 1: < M < / - V/. The searcher will overfly the TEL once if and only if the TEL is located in
the interval (u, u + vt) when it becomes exposed, so
p(\; u,x) = J
= X. (5.2)
The searcher cannot fly over the TEL twice in this case, so
P(2;m,jc) = 0, (5.3)
and p(0; u,x)=\-x. (5.4)
Case 2. 1 - vt<u< I - vt/2. The searcher will overfly the TEL once if and only if the TEL is located
in the interval (m, 21- u- vt) when it becomes exposed, so
p(l;«,x) = 2(!zi£hL' = 2(l-;)-x. (5.5)
The TEL is overflown twice in this case when it is in the interval (2/ - u - vt, I), so
p(2;«,x) = "-^' = x-(l-^), (5.6)
and p{0; u, x) = . (5.7)
Case 3: / - vt/2 <u<l. The searcher will overfly the TEL once if and only if the TEL is located in
the interval (21 - u - vt, u) at exposure time, so
/I \ 2u-2l + vt J. u\p{\;u,x)=
J
= x-2ll--J. (5.8)
The TEL is overflown twice in this case when it is in the interval (w, /), so
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p{2;u,x) = 4^ = . (5.9)
and p{0; u,x) = 2--^-x. (5.10)
By unconditioning on u (recall it is uniformly distributed over (0, 1)), if < x < 1,
from equations (5.4), (5.7) and (5.10),
from (5.2), (5.5) and (5.8)
2
piO-x) = l-x + ^, (5.11)
2
pi\-x) = (5.12)
and from (5.3), (5.6) and (5.9)
2
P(2;x) = ^. (5.13)
Equations (5.1 1), (5.12) and (5.13) give the distribution of the number of overflights when the
coverage ratio x is between and 1. By again conditioning on u it is straightforward to show that
the same expressions also hold for 1 < jc < 2. Again one needs to consider three cases, but now the
intervals of interest are (0, / - vt/2), (/ - vt/2, 21 - vt), and (2/ - vt, I).
By looking at each successive interval of length 2 one can show that:
For 2(n-l) <x < 2n, n = 1, 2, 3,....,
pi2n-2;x) = piO; x -2{n - \))
,
pi2n-\;x) = pi\;x-2{n-l)), (5.14)
p(2n; x) = p{2;x-2{n- 1))
p{j\ x) = Q otherwise.
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Thus the expressions in (5. 1 1 ), (5. 1 2) and (5. 1 3) are all that are required to find the
distribution of the number of overflights for all feasible values of jc. Figure 5.12 shows the distri-
Coverage Ratio x
Figure 5.12: Overflight Probabilities when coverage ratio is less than 2
bution of overflights for all values of the x between and 2. Note that at every point x the corre-
sponding points on the three curves add to 1
.
5.3 TEL Detection Probabilities, Single Overflight
Since sensors are not perfect, a vehicle that is being overflown by a sensor platform may or may
not be correctly identified. The sensor may indicate that a certain vehicle type is present even
though there is no vehicle beneath the sensor platform. We classify all vehicles on the road to be
one of three types, a TEL, a decoy made specifically to appear to be a TEL, or some unrelated ve-
hicle of no interest. In this section the objective is to find the probability that, given the sensor in-
dicates a a certain type of vehicle is being overflown, that in fact what is beneath the search
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platform is indeed a TEL. This probability depends on both the performance capabilities of the sen-
sor^ aboard the search vehicle, and the traffic environment along the road being searched.
Let Vbe a random variable that denotes the actual vehicle type being overflown, where Vcan
take on the outcomes t, d, o or for TELS, DECOYS, other vehicles and "no vehicle under the
search platform", respectively. On any single overflight by the searcher the outcome of the sensor
on board the searcher is a random variable S that has possible outcomes "t", "d", "o", and "0". The
quotes are used to help the reader distinguish the outcome of S from the outcome of V. For example,
if y = t, a real TEL is being overflown, whereas if S = "t", the sensor signals that a TEL is being
overflown; with an imperfect sensor it may or may not be a real TEL. The outcome S = "0" indi-
cates that the sensor does not identify any type of object as being overflown.
Consider a single overflight of a vehicle. Let Ps\v(s I v) be the probability that the sensor indi-
cates s, given that the vehicle type being overflown is v, for s e {"t", "d", "o", "0"} and v € {t, d,
o, 0}. These conditional probabilities would be determined by calibrating the sensor against known
object types in controlled experiments. Table 5.5 shows an example of these conditional probabil-
Sensor
outcome (5)
Vehicle type ( V)
TEL (t) Decoy (d) Other (0) None (0)
TEL ("t") 0.70 0.30 0.20 0.003
DECOY ("d") 0.15 0.50 0.30 0.003
OTHER ("0") 0.10 0.15 0.40 0.004
NONE ("0") 0.05 0.05 0.10 0.990
Table 5.5: Sensor performance against known vehicle types
ities for a sensor that is reasonably discriminating. When used against real TELs it correctly iden-
tifies them 70% of the time; it indicates they are decoys 15% of the time, other vehicles 10% of the
time, and gives no indication of a vehicle 5% of the time. It does not perform as well against decoys
or other vehicles. For example, it correctly identifies decoys only 50% of the time and other vehi-
cles 40% of the time. It indicates a vehicle is present 1% of the time when no vehicle is present.
2. The term sensor can be interpreted to mean a suite of sensors working together to identify TELS.
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Note that the columns each add to 1.0 since the elements in the table are probabilities conditioned
on each vehicle type.
How well this sensor performs in a given situation depends on the mixture of vehicle types
present and traffic density, that is the vehicular environment. Let py be the probability mass func-
tion in vector form of vehicle types in the order t, d, o. For example, = (0.3, 0.3, 0.4) indicates
that of all the vehicles on the road, 30% are TELs, 30% are DECOYS, and 40% other vehicles.
Note the elements of this vector always add to 1
.
Let/be the fraction of time there is a vehicle beneath the sensor platform so that/measures the
traffic density. An/value of 0. 1 indicates that on average only 10% of the road is covered by traffic
at any time, whereas a value of 0.9 would indicate an extremely busy road.
Now we are in a position to find the conditional probability Pv\s('^ ' that the vehicle type is v,
given that the sensor indicates type s. These are found from pv/,/and the probabilities in Table 5.5
using Bayes' rule,
where ps(s) = (ps\v(s I i)Pv(^) + Ps\v(s I d)pv{d) + ps^v(s I o)py{o))f+ ps\^is I 0)( 1
-f)
.
The use of Equations (5.15) is illustrated with the following three examples that are used through-
out the paper.
(i) TELS and Decoys Only
Let py = (0.8, 0.2, 0) and/= 0.2.This traffic vector indicates that the only vehicles on this road
are TELs and decoys in a ratio of 4: 1 . the value of/indicates that at any point in time only 10% of
the total road length is covered by traffic. For these conditions of light traffic that consists of only
TELS and decoys the conditional probabilities of all possible sensor outputs and vehicle types cal-
culated using equations (5.15) are shown in Table 5.6. First, note that there is no column for other
vehicles; conditional probabilities are not well defined for events that occur with probability 0.
Second, note that because the conditioning event is indicated by the row, the row sums are each






, if V = t, d, o.






TEL (t) Decoy (d) None (0)
TEL ("t") 0.88 0.090 0.02
DECOY ("d") 0.52 0.43 0.05
OTHER ( ) 0.63 0.24 0.13
NONE ("0") 0.01 0.00 0.99
Table 5.6: Sensor performance when Px = (0.8, 0.2, 0)
time; 9% of the time it is a decoy and 2% of the time no vehicle is present. Fourth, note that a TEL
could be present with probabilities 0.52, 0.63, and 0.01 if the sensor indicates a decoy, other vehi-
cle, or fails to indicate any type of vehicle, respectively.
(ii) Approximately Equal Mixture of TELs, Decoys, and Other Traffic
For this example let pv = (0.3, 0.3, 0.4) and/= 0.2; the traffic density on the road is the same




TEL (t) Decoy (d) Other (o) None (0)
TEL ("t") 0.54 0.23 0.20 0.03
DECOY C'd") 0.14 0.46 0.36 0.04
OTHER ("o") 0.12 0.18 0.64 0.06
NONE ("0") 0.004 0.004 0.010 0.982
Table 5.7: Sensor performance when px = (0.33, 0.33 0.34)
effect of dilution, the reduction of the fraction of TELs in the traffic. When the sensor indicates a
TEL, the vehicle being overflown is now a real TEL only 54% of the time, as compared to 88% in
Example (i). But note that when the sensor indicates a decoy it is a TEL only 14% of the time com-
pared to 52% of the time in Example (i).
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(iii) Small Proportion of TELS
Let pv= (0.05, 0.05, 0.9) and/= 0.2. Here 90% of the traffic consists of other traffic, so the




TEL (t) Decoy (d) Other (o) None (0)
TEL ("t") 0.15 0.06 0.74 0.05
DECOY ("d") 0.02 0.08 0.86 0.04
OTHER ("o") 0.01 0.02 0.93 0.04
NONE ("0") 0.001 0.001 0.022 0.976
Table 5.8: Sensor performance when px = (0.05, 0.05 0.9)
in Table 5.8. When the sensor indicates a TEL there is only a 15% chance that it is correct. There
is an 85% chance that it is a decoy, some other type of vehicle or nothing at all, a very high false
alarm (or false positive) rate. This clearly indicates the difficulties of observing rarely occurring
events among a large amount of clutter. In such cases the sensor needs to be extraordinarily dis-
criminating to be useful.
5.4 TEL Detection Probabilities, Multiple Overflights
It is important to keep in mind that the probabilities shown in Tables 5.6, 5.7 and 5.8 apply to
a single overflight of a vehicle. As shown above, the searcher may pass over the vehicle a number
of times, depending on the coverage ratio. The goal of this section is to determine how well the
sensor performs as a function of the coverage ratio x in addition to the road traffic environment.
Consider the case where the number of overflights is 2. There are sixteen (4^) possible sensor
outcomes, namely {("t", "t"), ("t", "d"), ("t", "o"), ("t", "0"), ("d", "t"), ("d", "d"), ("d", "o"), ("d",
"0"), ("o", "t"), ("o", "d"), ("o", "o"), ("o", "0"), ("0", "t"), ("0", "d"), ("0", "o"), ("0", "0)}. Some
assumption must be made as to how to resolve conflicting sensor outputs on the two or more over-
flights. Since time is among the most critical factors in successfully prosecuting TELs, in this paper
it is assumed that the first positive sensor output (any outcome other than "0") is used to classify
the object.
48
For two overflights the vehicle would be classified as a TEL if and only if the output was a member
of the set {("t", "t"), ("t", "d"), ("t", "o"), ("t", "0"), or ("0", "t")}. In general the vehicle is classi-
fied to be the first non-empty observation.
Define T„ to be the event {sensor indicates a Tel, given n overflights of a vehicle), so
T„ = {("t"), or ("0", "t"), or . .
.
, or ("0", . . ,"0", "t")}, where the last vector has (n-l) "0'"s.
Since these events are mutually exclusive,
Pr{T„\V= v} = PrVT\V= v) + Pr{"0", "t"IV= v} + . . . + Pr{"0", . . , "0", "t'W= v}.
Assuming conditional independence of each sensor output given the vehicle type, it is straight for-
ward to show that for w = 1,2,...
Pr{T„,V= v) =//7v(v)/7„v("t"lv)(l-/7„v("0"lv)")/(l-p5iv("0"lv)), V = t, d, o, (5.16)
= (l-y)p^v("t"lv)(l-p5lv("0"lv)")/(l-;^5IV<"0"lv)), V = 0.
These are added over v to determine the unconditional probability
PA-{T„}=X,Pr{T„,V=v}. (5.17)
Finally, using py and /together with Equations (5.16) and (5.17) the conditional probability of a
vehicle being a particular type, given n overflights and it is identified as a TEL, is given by Bayes'
Rule to be
Pr{V=v\ T,,} = r{T„\V=v}p^v)f/Pr{T„}, v = t, d, o, (5.18)
= r{TJV=v}(l -f)/Pr{T„},v = 0.
Let D„ and 0„ be the events that a vehicle is identified as a decoy and other vehicle, respectively,
given n overflights. The analysis leading to Equation (5. 1 8) can be repeated using either D„ and 0„
in place of T„ to show that
Pr{ V= vl = r{D„\V= v}p^v)/fPr{D„}, v = t, d, o, (5.19)
= r{D„IV=v}(l-y)/Pr{D„},v = 0.
and
Pr[V= vl 0„} = r{0„IV= v)py(v)f/Pr{0„}, v = t, d, o, (5.20)
= r{OJV=v}(l -/)/Pr{O„},v = 0.
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We are now in a position to calculate the probability that a sensor indicates a a given type of
vehicle is present for a given coverage ratio x and a given sensor output. Let T(x) be the event { sen-
sor indicates a Tel, given the coverage ratio is x). Then
Pr{Tix)\S=: s} = '^Pr{T„\S= s}p{n;x), (5.21)
where p{n; x) satisfies Equation (5.14). In the next section Equation (5.21) is used to show graph-
ically the effects of changes in model parameters on the performance of the sensor under varying
conditions.
5.5 Model Analysis
This section contains a number of graphs that have been calculated using Equation (5.21) in a
Microsoft Excel spreadsheet. These graphs show the effectiveness of the sensor under various traf-
fic conditions, as well as showing the effects of changing the sensor performance characteristics
through the conditional probabilities in Table 5.5 on page 45.
5.5.1 Traffic Density Effects
Figure 5.13 shows a plot of the probability that a TEL is really present, given that the sensor
indicates that a TEL is present, for a coverage ratio in the range (0,6). The plot was obtained using
the probabilities in Table 5.5, the traffic vector in Example (ii), Pv= (0.3, 0.3, 0.4), and three val-
ues of the traffic density /. Note that changing the traffic density from 0.5 to 0.9 makes very little
difference, but when the traffic density is low there is a significant degradation in sensor operation-
al performance. Note the drop in performance as the coverage ratio exceeds 2. This is caused by
the fact that the sensor can give positive readings when no traffic is present; when the traffic den-
sity is low there is a greater opportunity for the sensor to give false indications. Note also that a
coverage ratio of approximately 2 is optimal for a very wide range of traffic densities.
5.5.2 Vehicle Mixture Effects
Figure 5.14 shows a plot of the probability that a TEL is really present, given that the sensor
indicates that a TEL is present, for a coverage ratio in the range (0,6). The plot was obtained using
the probabilities in Table 5.5, a traffic density of 0.2, and the traffic vectors in Examples (i), (ii)
and (iii). We see again that a coverage factor of approximately 2 gives the best operational perfor-
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mance of a very wide mixture of traffic. The curves clearly demonstrate how the unreliable a sensor
outcome can become as the fraction of traffic on the road that is of interest becomes small. With a
coverage factor of 2 a sensor indication of a TEL is correct almost 90% of the time when 80% of
the traffic is made up of TELS; it is correct only about 15% of the time when only 5% of the traffic
is made up of TELS.
5.5.3 False Negatives
Figure 5.15 shows a plot of the probability that a particular vehicle type is really present, given
that the sensor indicates that a TEL is present, for a coverage ratio in the range (0,6). The plot was
obtained using the probabilities in Table 5.5 and the traffic vector and traffic density in Example
(ii). For every value of x greater than 2 the points on the four curves add to 1.0 since they form a
conditional probability mass function over possible vehicle types. For every value of x less than 2,
the four curves add to the probability of one or more overflights. This graph clearly shows the
monotone increasing (with jc) probability of there being no vehicle present when the sensor indi-
cates a TEL. If the entry in the lower right corner of Table 5.5, i.e. Pr{S = I V = 0}, were 1, this
line would be zero for all x. As a result the other three lines would level off at x=2 and would not
decrease. It is the possibility that the sensor can indicate some type of vehicle is present when in
fact no vehicle is present that leads to the presence of a maximum in the curves when the coverage
factor is approximately 2.
5.5.4 False Positives
Figure 5.16 shows a plot of the probability that the vehicle present is a TEL, given that the sen-
sor indicates each of the three vehicle types is present, for a coverage ratio in the range (0,6). The
plot was obtained using the probabilities in Table 5.5 and the traffic vector and traffic density in
Example (ii). Again the maximum probability that the vehicle is a TEL given that the sensor indi-
cates a TEl is when x is approximately 2. Unfortunately this is also the value of coverage ratio that
maximizes the probability it is a TEL given that it is a decoy or some other vehicle.
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Figure 5.14: Effect of Traffic Mixture on Pr{Vehicle is a TELI Sensor indicates a TEL}
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Pr{Actual Vehicle Type I Sensor indicates a TEL}
p, =(0.3, 0.3, 0.4), / = 0.2
Pr{V=tlT(x)} Pr{V=dlT(x)) Pr{V=olT(x)) Pr{V=0lT(x)}
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Figure 5.16: /*r{Vehicle is a TEL I Sensor indicates given vehicle type}
55
6: Supression Effects of Searching for Tels
Kneale T. Marshall
6.1 Introduction
In an earlier paper (Ref. [6]) Conner, Ehlers and Marshall showed how a simple circulation
model based on submarine operations in world war two could be used to understand better the op-
erations of theater tactical missile operations. This model was used to demonstrate that effective
operations against the launchers could lead to significant payoff in solving the theater missile de-
fense (TMD) problem. This circulation model was extended in Marshall (Ref. [7]), and used to
quantify and demonstrate that a modest success against launchers, measured in terms of kill prob-
ability, can significantly reduce the numbers of boost-phase, upper-tier and lower-tier weapons re-
quired to counter a given threat.
Analysis of the data on anti-ballistic-missile-launcher operations from World War 2 through
Desert Storm shows a discouraging lack of success in killing the launchers. This has resulted in the
widely-held belief that the problem is too difficult so that concentration of effort is today focussed
heavily on active defense. The author agrees that active defense will be an essential element to suc-
cessful anti-TBM operations, but believes also that such operations could be easily overwhelmed
without some success at disrupting launch operations. The paper takes a closer look at launcher op-
erations with emphasis on quantifying and understanding the effects such operations might have
on suppression of missile launches rather than hard kills. The ideas put forth below came in part
from conversations with CAPT George Conner, USNR (Ret) whose navy career encompassed
ASW operations. Other ideas came reading McCue (Ref. [9]) where it is shown how increasing
transit times of U-boats across the Bay of Biscay in World War 2 was a significant factor in coun-
tering the U-boat campaign. In general, McCue compares improvements in technology to improve-
ments in tactics and operations. In his overview he states:
"Much modern analysis aims to determine the "system requirements" for new or
proposed weapon systems and tofind ways to meet those requirements that cannot
be defeated by enemy countermeasures. ... , in the U-boat war, the introduction
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and assimilation of new hardware proceeded so slowly that an inherently defeat-
able device could have a useful career while the other side spent time realizing that
the device had been deployed, arguing about what it was, and introducing a coun-
terdevice. Moreover, the "top-down" approach to weapon design, in which
the design is derivedfrom the requirements, isfundamentally inappropriate in cas-
es involving possible enemy countermeasures the finding of wartime opera-
tions researchers [was] that new tactics or operational policies can have as much
impact as new equipment, and often more immediately. " (Ref. [9], pp 3-4)
6.2 Measures of Effectiveness
The obvious measure of effectiveness to use in TMD is the number or fraction of hard kills of
missiles and/or launchers during a campaign. Using these measures attack operations against
launchers would be considered very ineffective. However, there is evidence in the data from Desert
Storm that even though attack operations against missile launchers resulted in few, if any, verified
launcher kills, the presence of search and destroy assets in the search area resulted in suppression
of missile launch rates. Not only were the launch rates decreased but the ability of the enemy to
coordinate launches into salvos was clearly reduced. Similar effects were observed by McCue in
the anti U-boat campaign:
"From the "What if . . . " analyses emerges a detailed understanding of the rela-
tionships inherent in the U-boat campaign. As Donitz realized even before the war
began,. ..the U-boats, despite their submersibility, moved andfought best on the sur-
face and submerged only when threatened: they could be thought ofas submersible
torpedo boats [Marshall: Mobile underwater missile launchers]. Bay search turns
out to have been effective largely because it encouraged U-boats to make lengthy
submerged passages, cutting into the time they could spend at sea sinking merchant
vessels. (Ref. [9], p 17)
The effect in TMD similar to that found by McCue for U-boats is the tendency of launchers to go
into hiding for substantial time periods when threatened with detection and destruction by search
and destroy assets. These hide times can add significantly to the basic time it would take a launcher
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to return to its reload point, be prepared for another launch, refuel etc., and return to its firing lo-
cation. The next section presents a model from which can be calculated the kill probability that is
equivalent to increasing launcher cycle times, given a campaign of a certain length.
6.3 Basic Notation and Model
Consider a single launcher active in a campaign of length T. Assume that if this launcher can
operate with impunity its cycle time from leaving the missile mating/refuelling area until its return
after firing its missile, is Tq. Extending the notion used in Chapter 4, let
m = maximum number of missiles a launcher can launch if given unlimited launch time,
m = maximum number of missiles a launcher can launch given 7 and Tq,
= survival probability of launcher on outward leg to launch site,
^2 = survival probability of launcher on inward leg from launch site to reload,
X = number of missiles launched per launcher (random variable).
From Equation (4.1) on page 23
Figure 6.17 shows the result using equations (6.1) and (6.2) with w = 16 and 7= 144 hours.
The four curves are for the cases where the before-launch and after-launch kill probabilities are
S-1:/?, =/72 = 0,
S-2: = and = 0.05,
S-3: /?, = 0.05 and p2 = 0,
S-4: Pi=P2 = 0.05.
The measure plotted on the horizontal axis is the launcher cycle time.
This simple model leads to some interesting observations. First, note that with a small success
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Figure 6.17: Expected Number of Missiles Launched vs. Cycle Time.
expected number of missiles launched per launcher, E[X], is cut from 16 to about 1 1 when the
launcher cycle time is less than 9 hours. Second, with 5% kill probabilities on both legs E[X] is cut
from 16 to about 8, cutting in half the missiles that would require the use of active defense weap-
ons. Third, the S-1 curve shows that even when the launcher kill probabilities are both zero simply
increasing cycle time above 9 hours leads to a significant reduction in E[X]. This effect is what we
refer to as suppression. Fourth, note that S-4 is almost horizontal showing that the when both
launcher kill probabilities are 0.05 the suppression effect is very small for all values of Tq up to
about 24 hours.
From Equation (6.2) one can see that changing the campaign length relative to the cycle length
will change the value of m and hence the value of E[X]. Rather than replotting Figure 6.17 when-
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ever the campaign length changes, the same analysis can be carried out on a plot where the ratio
TqIT is plotted on the horizontal axis. Such a plot is shown in Figure 6. 1 8.
6.4 Equivalent Kill Probabilities
The observations in the above paragraph lead to the definition of the concept of "equivalent kill
probability" of suppression. Suppose that, when unhindered, launchers operate with a cycle time
of 10 hours (see left vertical line in Figure 6.17). If the kill probabilities and pi are and 0.05,
respectively, each launcher would launch on average 10.7 missiles. But following the horizontal
line in Figure 6. 17 to where it meets S-1 , we see that we could obtain this value of E{X\ by having
Px and p2 both but extending the cycle time from 10 hours to 14.2 hours (see right vertical line in
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Figure 6.17). Thus if by search and destroy tactics the launcher cycle time can be increased by
about four hours, the effect would be the same as obtaining a 5% after-launch kill probability of
the launcher. That is, the four hour cycle extension has an equivalent kill probability on the return
leg of the cycle of 0.05.
An easy way to obtain the equivalent kill probability in a given situation is graphically as is
demonstrated above. An example using Figure 6.18 are now given. Let the maximum number of
launches from a launcher given unlimited launch time be sixteen as before. Suppose you expect a
campaign to last ten days and that unimpeded launcher cycle times are expected to be twelve hours.
These parameter values lead to TqIT = 0.05. From Figure 6. 1 8 we see that if = and pi = 0.05,
the expected number of launches per launcher would be about eleven. To achieve this value by sup-
pression alone the launcher cycle time would need to be increased to 0.096x24x10 = 23 hours.
Thus the required increase in cycle time wound be nine hours. If the estimated campaign length
were twelve days rather than ten days, the required increase in cycle time would be about sixteen
hours. If the estimated campaign length were reduced to eight days, the required increase in cycle
time would drop to about six hours.
We end this paper with quote from McCue concerning the usefulness to a decision maker of
simple analytic models such as the one shown above, or those found in other papers in this docu-
ment:
Many balk at the use ofquantitative methods in the study ofmilitary matters, hold-
ing thatjudgment and experience - perhaps their own - havefar more to offer than
any calculation possibly could. Judgment and experience are valuable guides in
any human endeavor. However, war - and especially the kind of search operation
investigated here - entails a great deal of uncertainty. Those who deal with uncer-
tainty in war by playing hunches seem likely to share thefate of those who use that
approach in poker or backgammon. (Ref. [9], p. 17).
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7: A Pre-Hostilities Decision Model
for TMD Attack Operations'
Kneale T. Marshall
7.1 Introduction
The United States does not have the resources to monitor all possible areas where mobile mis-
sile launchers may be deployed. The decision to expend resources in a given area before any hos-
tilities break out, the level of resource allocation, and the methods of employing it, all must depend
on the likelihood of hostilities in the area that would affect US national interests. The purpose of
this paper is to present methods and models intended to aid a decision maker better understand the
trade-offs and risks involved. The overall problem is complex, and the models presented here are
intended to show the basic structure. Influence diagrams and decision trees are the tools used to
help formulate and analyze the problem.
7.2 Problem Structure
The first assumption made is that the path to hostilities follows the three stages of peacetime,
mobilization, and hostile action. The second assumption is that two distinct decisions must be
made. The first is whether or not to gather intelligence in peacetime, and how to carry this out. The
second is what action to take against the mobile missile launchers during mobilization. It is as-
sumed that if hostilities occur the US would be involved in reducing to a minimum the expected
number of TBM's launched against friendly nations.
Let 2)| be the set of alternatives available to the decision maker during peacetime with elements
JjG We assume that it consists of three elements:
t/i = if no action is taken to gain intelligence,
i/i = 1 if covert intelligence effort is undertaken,
dx = 2 '\i overt intelligence effort is undertaken.
1. Based on material which first appeared in the thesis by Mark A. Ehlers.
2. The political questions of possible coalition involvement are not relevant to this report. Our objective is to
model the effects of pre-hostilities intelligence gathering on a possible future conflict.
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Let Di be the set of decisions available during mobilization with elements l^i- We assume that
it consists of three elements:
= if no action is taken to gain intelligence
= 1 if overt intelligence effort is undertaken,
^2 = 2 if interdiction of mobile launchers is undertaken.
It is a model assumption that interdiction at the mobilization decision stage is an option only if
there has been intelligence performed during peacetime. Interdiction can take many forms. At this
stage we do not specify how it is carried out, but simply assume that it will result in a lowering of
the expected numbers of missiles launched.
Whichever decision is made during peacetime, the enemy decision to mobilize is uncertain. Let
the random variable M = 1 if the enemy mobilizes and if it does not. Inherent in this definition is
the concept of a time period, say for example, a year. If mobilization does occur during the year,
M=l. Otherwise it is zero and the decision problem can be repeated in the next period. The distri-
bution ofM is assumed to depend on the first decision with
Pr{M=llD,=/} =m, if/ = 0,1,
Pr{M=llD,=2} =m2.
Similarly, whichever decision is made during mobilization, the enemy decision to start hostil-
ities is uncertain. Let // be a Bernoulli random variable that is 1 if hostilities break out and if they
do not. The distribution ofH is assumed to depend on both decisions and on M with
Pr{//=1ID,=0, A/=l, D2=0} = /i,,
Pr { //= 1 ID,=i, M= 1
,
^2=2 } = /i2 if / = 0, 1 ,2.
We assume that if D2=3 (interdiction after observing mobilization) hostilities are assumed to have
broken out, or//=l with probability 1.
Let !^be the set of possible results of the decision process with elements r€ % An element r
represents the expected number of TBM's launched. Clearly this will depend on the decisions
made and on the behavior of the enemy. Let
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r = if hostilities do not break out,
r = r, if no intelligence effort is applied during peacetime or mobilization and hos-
tilities break out,
r = r2 if no intelligence effort is applied during peacetime but is carried out overtly
during mobilization, and hostilities break out,
r = r3 if covert intelligence effort is applied during peacetime, overt intelligence is
applied in mobilization, and hostilities break out,
r = r4 if overt intelligence effort is applied during both peacetime and mobilization,
and hostilities break out,
r = r5 if covert or overt intelligence effort is applied during peacetime and launcher
interdiction is undertaken during mobilization.
Figure 7.19 shows the structure of the decision problem in an influence diagram. For a fuller treat-
ment of influence diagrams and decision trees, with detailed demonstrations and examples of their
use in building and solving decision models, see Ref. [5].







Figure 7.19: Influence Diagram for the Decision Problem
among the events. The first event is the decision D] (decisions are depicted with square nodes) as
to the type, if any, of intelligence gathering to undertake in peacetime. The next event is M, whether
or not the enemy mobilizes (uncertain events are depicted by circles). This is followed by the mo-
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bilization decision Dj, then the observation of whether or not hostilities break out, H, and finally
the result R is observed (shown as a diamond node).
Directed arcs between nodes imply possible dependence and are carefully defined. Consider
the three arcs leaving . The one that ends at D2 indicates that D| is not forgotten when D2 is made,
and the mobilization decision can be affected by the peacetime decision. For example, if the peace-
time decision is not to undertake intelligence gathering (Dj = 0), the mobilization decision cannot
be interdiction since we have no knowledge of the whereabouts of the missile launchers. If the
peacetime decision is overt intelligence gathering (D| = 2) the overt character of these efforts may
affect the enemy's decision to mobilize (change the distribution of H). If the peacetime decision is
covert intelligence gathering (Dj = 1) since these efforts would be unknown to the enemy they can-
not affect H or M? The arc from M to D2 shows that the enemy mobilization decision is known
before the US decision on intelligence gathering in this period is made. The arc from MtoH shows
that these random events are dependent. The arc from to H indicates the dependence of the dis-
tribution ofH on D2. Finally, once D2 has been made and the outcome of // is known (//=1 if hos-
tilities break out, if not), the resulting expected number of SRBM's launched can be calculated.
The decision tree for this problem is shown in Figure 7.20. The sequence of the nodes follows
that shown in the influence diagram. Extending from each decision node are branches that repre-
sent all possible decision options at that stage. Each of the decision branches terminates at a ran-
dom event node representing possible mobilization.
The decision nodes are marked D, for the peacetime decision and D2 for the mobilization de-
cision. The random event nodes are labeled M for mobilization and H for hostilities. Extending
from each decision node is a branch for each decision alternative in the sets (D^ and 1)2, and from
each random event node are two branches that represent the uncertain outcome, 1 or 0. The result
values shown at the terminal diamond nodes, and the conditional probabilities on the branches
leaving the M and H nodes, are those defined earlier in this section.
3. Note that if overt operations were not considered from the outset we could remove the directed arcs be-










































Figure 7.20: The Intelligence Effort Decision TVee
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The notation m and h have been used to represent the probabihties of mobilization and hostil-
ities occurring respectively. Subscripts are used to differentiate between estimated parameters un-
der different policies. The following probabilities are required:
m, = Pr{ mobilization occurs, given no or covert intelligence effort in peacetime}
= P/-{M=1ID,=0} =Pr{M=llD,=l},
m2 = Pr{M= 1ID,=2}.
hx = Pr{ hostilities occur, given no intel. effort in either peacetime or mobilization}
= Pr{//=1ID,=0, M=l, D2=0},
h2 = Pr{ hostilities occur, given overt intelligence during mobilization}
= Pr{H=\\M=\,D2=\},
These probabilities are attached to the appropriate branches of the decision tree.
Parameter Ordering Assumptions
From the structure of the problem thus far it is reasonable to make some assumptions on the
relative values of the m,'s, /z,'s and r,'s. First we assume that overt intelligence gathering in peace-
time and/or mobilization acts as deterrence. It results in a probability of mobilization that is no larg-
er than, and quite likely is smaller than, what it would be if no intelligence were gathered or it was
gathered covertly. This implies that
m|>m2. (7.1)
Similarly, once mobilization has begun, it is assumed that overt intelligence will result in lowering
(or at least not raising) the likelihood that hostilities break out. Thus
/i, > /i2. (7.2)
Second we assume that the more information we have the more successful we will be in reducing
the expected number of missiles launched if hostilities break out. We also assume that the most
effective way to reduce this number is to interdict the launchers during mobilization. Thus
r,>r2>r3>r4>r5. (7.3)
These assumptions play an important role in the next subsection.
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Problem Solution
As in solving any decision tree we start at the terminal nodes in Figure 7.20. As we work back
to the D^ node we take expected values at the random nodes and minima at decision nodes. At the
three D2 nodes starting at the top of the diagram, the expected result for each is Mm{/i|ri, /i2^2}'
Min{r^, hjr^}, and Min{r^, hjr^}. From the inequalities in (7.2) and (7.3) the first of these minima
can be resolved immediately. The optimal policy to pursue if no intelligence is gathered in peace-
time and mobilization occurs, is to start overt intelligence gathering immediately with an expected
result equal to /i2''2- Resolution of the other two minima will depend on the relative value of /12; we
look at three cases.
Case I: {r^lr^)<h2< 1.
This implies that < hir^, and with (7.3) that < hjr^. This shows us that if intelligence has
been gathered in peacetime no matter whether it be covert or overt, if mobilization occurs the op-
timal policy for this case is to interdict the launchers.
Case II: < /12 < (rg/rj).
For this case > hjrj and > hjr^. These show us that if intelligence has been gathered in
peacetime no matter whether it be covert or overt, if mobilization occurs the optimal policy for this
case is to continue gathering intelligence, but overtly.
Case III: (rj/rj) <h2< {r^lu).
For this case < hir^, and > hjr^. These show us that if covert intelligence has been gathered
in peacetime and mobilization occurs, the optimal policy for this case is to interdict the launchers.
If overt intelligence has been gathered in peacetime and mobilization occurs, the optimal policy for
this case is to continue overt intelligence.
With the minima resolved at the Dj nodes we can take expectations at the M nodes and finally
find the minimum at the Dj node. At the topM node the expected return is m^hiri- At the other two
M nodes it will depend which of the three cases pertains, so each must be analyzed separately.
Casel: (r5/r4)</i2< 1.
At the middle M node the expected payoff is m^r^ and at the lower one miTs- At node Z), we
need to find
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Using the inequalities in (7.1), (7.2) and (7.3), if we denote by r* the minimum expected result,
r* = mjrj.
Case II: < /12 < (rj/rj).
At the middle and lowerM nodes the expected payoffs are mxhjrj, and m2/i2^4 respectively. We
find the minimum of these and m^hiri, so that
r* = m2/i2/'4.
Case III: {r^lr-^) < /12 < (/-5/r4).
At the middle and lower M nodes the expected payoffs are m^r^ and m2/i2''4 respectively. We
find the minimum of these and m^h2r2, so that again
r = niihirj^.
To summarize the results,
1. In peacetime undertake overt intelligence gathering (Z)|*=2).
2. If mobilization occurs
a. If hi < {r^lr^), continue overt intelligence until
hostilities occur (D2*=l),
b. If /12 > {r^r^, interdict launchers {d2*=2).
Figure 7.21 shows these results graphically, together with the expected result if no action is taken
prior to hostilities.
7.3 Circulation and Decision Model Synthesis
In the decision model in the previous section assume the payoffs are measured in expected
numbers of missiles launched. Equation (4.1) in Chapter 4 gives the expected number of missile
launched by launcher i. The result measures from the decision model, (r, through r^) can be ex-
pressed as
= ' 7=1,2,3,4,5. (7.4)
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Figure 7.21: Optimal Policies and Expected Payoff Function
where the superscript (j) on the parameters refers to the subscript on r. For example, n^'^ represents
the estimated number of launchers remaining given the peacetime decision is no effort (Z)|=0), mo-
bilization occurs (M = 1), the mobilization decision is no effort (^2=0), and hostilities occur (H =
1). The symbol m is the maximum number of missiles that can be launched from a single launcher
(see Chapter 4).
Let n be the number of launchers before the start of any hostilities. It follows that
(7.5)
as nothing is done prior to hostilities to reduce the number of launchers in these instances. If the
interdiction decision is made we assume that action is taken against launchers on their way from
storage to the forward staging area resulting in n^^^ < n.
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It is assumed in this report that more intelHgence leads to a reduced chance of launcher survival
during the outbound leg of the cycle. This is expressed as
Once hostilities start, it is assumed the launcher survival probability qi on the outbound leg of the
launcher cycle is approximately the same whether peacetime intelligence is followed by more in-
telligence, or by interdiction upon threat mobilization. Since post-missile-launch counter effort tac-
tics are based on the flaming datum, they are assumed to be independent of pre-hostility
intelligence effort. Therefore, it follows that all return transit launcher survival probabilities would
be equal,
q2^' = q2, (7.7)
for all j.
To determine the optimal policy. Figure 7.21 shows that the ratio r^/r^ is a critical quantity. Us-
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which is the estimated fraction of launchers remaining after interdiction. This result is shown in
Figure 7.22, and can be stated as follows:
Given that mobilization has occurred and intelligence is being gathered overtly in
this period, if the decision maker assesses the probability that hostilities will occur
to be higher than thefraction ofmissile launchers that are expected to survive pre-
emptive interdiction, then preemptive interdiction of the launchers is the optimal
course ofaction.
Intelligence Effort Level
Nothing has been said to this point about the type or level of intelligence effort. A detailed dis-
cussion of this topic is beyond the scope of this paper, but we include some remarks that show the












Figure 7.22: Optimal Policy in Terms of Fraction of Launchers Remaining
Figure 7.23 shows a typical curve of how the fraction of launchers that survive interdiction dur-
ing mobilization is reduced by increasing intelligence gathering efforts.Also shown is a line depict-
ing the effect of deterrence (and a dashed line showing no deterrence effect). For intelligence







Figure 7.23: Optimal Policies in Terms of Intelligence Effort
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The particular shape of the curve and the units used to measure the intelligence effort cannot
be discussed in this report. An obvious unit is man-hours of effort; another might be surveillance
flight hours. The S-shaped curve shown is typical of what one might expect, indicating little effect
from small amounts in intelligence effort and little effect from amounts above a certain threshold.
We can say little more at this preliminary stage of modeling.
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8: Analyses of Unattended Ground Sensors in
Theater Ballistic Missile Defense Attack Operations^
by
Richard J. Haberlin, Jr.
8.1 Introduction
Unattended ground sensors have a significant potential for improving Tactical Ballistic Missile
Attack Operations. However, a lack of confidence in the systems and a lack of tactical doctrine
have limited their employment to date. This paper provides analyses that demonstrate the effective
use of sensor technology and provides recommendations as to how ground sensors may best be em-
ployed. The relatively disappointing effectiveness of active defense systems such as Patriot has
illustrated the need for more reliable, yet cost-effective, means of defending theater forces.
Since the 1960's, ground sensors have been used to sharpen the theater tactical picture with
limited effect. An early attempt, the McNamara Line of 1967, was aimed at slowing the flow of
military goods along the Ho Chi Minh Trail by identifying targets for air strikes. These were ar-
cane acoustic and seismic detectors with relaying aircraft, both manned and remotely piloted, used
to monitor the output. The normal time between target acquisition and weapon delivery was ap-
proximately five minutes, yet few kills were confirmed (Ref. [10]). These poor results have been
attributed to the unreliable and limited output of the sensors. Specifically, the sensors of the Mc-
Namara Line could determine if a target was personnel, wheeled vehicle, or tracked vehicle. For
the United States, the losses fighting the sensor war were significant. Of the more than 600 planes
and helicopters lost in Laos, one half to two-thirds were lost to defensive positions along the Ho
Chi Minh Trail (Ref. [10]). Today's mission is similar, but the sensors have improved tenfold.
The key, however, remains detecting and identifying a viable military target against which minimal
assets are directed.
A Time Critical Target (TCT) is any military vehicle which, from its standard tactics, can be
expected to remain on a road system for a period not to exceed 30 minutes. As a result, actions
1. Edited version of LT Haberlin's MS paper in Operations Research
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taken to prosecute this type of target must be made expeditiously. TCTs include Transporter-erec-
tor Launcher (TEL) units, command vehicles, missile fuel trucks, missile loading trailers, and mo-
bile SAM units, among others. During the Gulf War American Pilots used random search tactics
in an attempt to locate Iraqi TELs. Not only did this tactic prove largely unsuccessful, but it re-
quired the coalition to completely control the airspace above the battlefield. A more prudent tactic
would be to send friendly aircraft over hostile territory only to prosecute a specific target already
detected, located and identified by electronic means.
8.1.1 General Background
Theater ballistic missile (TBM) defense basically follows two discrete doctrines. Counterforce
is aimed at the destruction of a TCT as it travels to and from its assembly area for reloading and
maintenance. Active defense is aimed at the destruction of the individual tactical ballistic missile
after launch during the boost, reentry or terminal phases. Only the counterforce strikes the target
while it is slow-moving and, more importantly, only counter force prevents future use of the same
TCT and its crew. It has been shown that counterforce, even in modest proportions, geometrically
reduces the incoming tactical ballistic missile threat (Ref. [7]).
In the pre-hostility phase of a conflict, it will become necessary to locate and monitor TBM
vehicles to prepare an adequate counter-attack should the conflict escalate. In addition to national
collection assets, unattended ground sensors, placed strategically along known or suspected TCT
travel routes, would aid in the development of a clear tactical picture to meet this end. Special Op-
erations forces are also ideally suited for this type of work, but they constitute a limited and valu-
able commodity. Laying the sensor arrays, however, would definitely be a part of the pre-conflict
Special Operations repertoire.
Should hostilities escalate to the point where armed response is required, a prime concern of
the theater commander in the early phase of the conflict is the enemy TBM threat. It is in this early
phase that the enemy has the greatest chance of surprise, and the full strength of its TBM force.
TCT routes confirmed in the pre-hostility phase by ground sensors can now be covered by combat
air patrol (CAP) or lethal unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV) awaiting a targeting order. Should a
sensor array indicate the presence of a TCT, the theater commander can order the prosecution of
that target by assets already on station. Turnaround times would be similar to those of the Mc-
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Namara Line, but only against mission essential targets. Additionally, unlike the Gulf War, aircraft
would be used for strike only, not for search. This would free additional sorties for the CAP mis-
sions.
There is also a political advantage to preparing a battlefield with unattended ground sensors.
Through CNN America saw technology and training win a nearly bloodless battle in the Gulf War.
Continuing this trend will require the reduction in the number of humans on the battlefield. Simply
put.
There would be far less anger directed against an encounter in which the United
States was putting hardware, not men, on the line and one which American casualty
lists were dominated by decimated sensors, burnt-out computers, and downed RPVs
(Ref. [11]).
America's growing need for instant access to newsworthy information and demand for quickly
resolved conflicts will require commanders to keep theater conflicts short and neat. It may be nei-
ther feasible nor desirable to await the final breakdown of negotiations before pinpointing enemy
TBM forces. The use of unattended ground sensors could aid in defining hostile depots, staging
areas, and hide sites prior to hostilities.
8.1.2 Analyses
The analyses provided in this document emphasize the use of unattended ground sensors in the
locating and positive identification of time critical targets. Some degree of friendly intelligence
capability is assumed in that candidate sensor array sites are chosen within the theater, and realistic
enemy TCT populations are used. With the arrays in place, the decision maker must be able to
evaluate the output of the array to determine, with some degree of confidence, if the target before
the array is a TCT or a false indication.
The probabilistic decision model is developed and described in Section 8.2. It is based on there
being a finite number of sensors available in a specific theater, with a fixed number of pre-deter-
mined candidate array sites. Further inputs include the approximate fraction of vehicle traffic as-
sumed to be TCTs on each road to be seeded. This assumption is based on the belief that the
intelligence analysts have pre-determined the most likely areas for TBM activity.
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From the above input data, the model reports the optimal size array for each of the candidate
locations. Additionally, the decision maker is provided with an optimal policy for determining the
likelihood that the target is a TCT based on the number of sensors in agreement as to its identity.
This policy may vary with each candidate array.
In Section 8.3, recommendations are provided on the placement of the arrays and their best
configuration to maximize information gained while minimizing the likelihood of compromise.
Specifics addressed include, inter-sensor spacing, placement patterns, array locations, and off-road
distance.
Section 8.4 contains an analysis of the optimal location for the sensor array, along a given road.
Considerations include locating at road intersections, along roads away from intersections, and at
choke points through which roads pass.
Finally, Section 8.5 contains conclusions on all the analyses performed and provides a step-by-
step procedure for defining, locating, and utilizing sensor arrays in a theater of operations.
8.2 Models and Assumptions
In the quest to determine the optimal sensor deployment scheme, it is most important to choose
a model representative of actual Theater Ballistic Missile Defense (TBMD) operations. After
some important clarifications, this section introduces the two separate models used in this paper.
First it is necessary to introduce the reader to the terminology common to TBM operations.
Next, the reader 1 learns why the probability of detection can be assumed equal to one for an array
of one or more sensors, and how this differs from the probability of correct identification. After
introducing the equations which drive the numerical analysis of the probability of identification,
the reader finds a description of the measures of effectiveness used to analyze the optimal policy.
Finally, the assumptions common to both models are discussed to prepare the reader for the mod-
els, whose introductions end the paper.
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8.2.1 Terminology
Before proceeding, we define the terminology used throughout this document.
1. Time Critical Target
A Time Critical Target (TCT) is any military vehicle which, from its standard tactics, can be
expected to remain on the road system for a period not to exceed 30 minutes. As a result of this,
actions taken to prosecute this type of target must be made expeditiously. TCTs include Transport-
er-erector Launcher (TEL) units, command vehicles, missile fuel trucks, missile loading trailers,
and mobile Surface to Air Missile (SAM) units, among others.
2. ''Steel Rattler'' Unattended Ground Sensor
The "Steel Rattler" is a multi-component unattended ground sensor system with seismic,
acoustic and infrared detection and identification capabilities produced by Sandia National Labo-
ratory in Albuquerque, New Mexico. The seismic/acoustic system first detects a target of interest
and attempts to match its signature with a pre-loaded signature database. The time of detection,
system position, and identification are sent via satellite link to a decision maker in the fusion center.
If a positive identification is not possible, the seismic and acoustic systems "wake up" the infrared
sensor which is positioned further along the expected route of travel. The infrared sensor transmits
to the fusion center a still-photographic thermal image of the target of interest at its closest point
of approach. From this image, a system operator identifies the target. If the seismic and acoustic
systems make an identification, the infrared sensor remains dormant. Current units are designed
to be hand placed; air deployable units are undergoing testing. Air deployable units will not have
infrared sensors. The analysis in this paper is based on the assumption that all sensors are identical
3. Sensor Array
An array consists of one or more unattended ground sensors operating as a single entity. That
is not to say that their information is shared. Each sensor operates independently, but the informa-
tion returned from the sensors in the array is treated as a single set of data.
4. Expected Loss
To measure properly the effects of varying array characteristics, it is necessary to derive a util-
ity function defining the relative value of all possible outcomes. Typically, one of the payoff val-
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ues is set equal to one, and the other outcomes are specified in relative terms. For the purpose of
this analysis, a leaker is given a value of two and a false alarm a value of one. That is, it is consid-
ered twice as detrimental to miss a TCT than it is to prosecute an innocent vehicle. The appendices
include analyses for other relative values of leakers and false alarms.
5. Probability of Detection
The probability of detection, Pj, is the single incident Bernoulli trial probability of success as-
sociated with the likelihood that the sensor identifies the presence of a target within its detection
range. It is important to note that a single sensor may have more than one opportunity to detect the
presence of a target, depending on the target's speed and the sensor sample rate. This phenomenon
is covered in greater detail later in this section.
6. Sensor Forecasts
In reality, the output of any sensor is a forecast. With this in mind, it is easy to see that the
probability of identification,/,, is the probability that the sensor correctly identifies the target in
front of it as a TCT given that it is a TCT. Similarly, the probability of false-identification, /q, is
the probability that the sensor incorrectly identifies the target before it as a TCT when, in fact, it is
not. These are values typically specified by the manufacturer of the sensor after operational testing
(Ref. [5]).
8.2.2 Probability of Detection
Modem acoustic, seismic and magnetic sensors sample at a fixed rate of samples per second.
The significance of this rate is that a TCT moving along a road may be investigated several times
by the same sensor, thereby increasing the overall probability of detection. In fact, it can be shown
that a "Steel Rattler" type of unattended ground sensor has a probability of detection approaching
one against vehicles moving along roads at reasonable speeds.
To illustrate this effect, assume a single vehicle is traveling down a road with velocity v kph.
Positioned along the road is an array of n = 1 sensor with maximum range /?n,ax meters and sample
rate samples per second. The maximum effective range is determined by geometry to be r, and
the sensor is positioned meters perpendicular to the road, as shown in Figure 8.24, where
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Figure 8.24: Single Sensor Probability of Detection
From Figure 8.24, it is evident that the vehicle will travel through 2r meters of sensor coverage for
this particular sensor. Further, moving at speed v, the vehicle will travel = meters
between sensor samples. Rearranging the above to solve for the number of samples, s, available
2r '7.2rf^
per sensor yields s = — = sensor samples. Therefore, as a function of the off-road




Note the use of the floor function to allow only integer values of s^d^).
(8.1)
Figure 8.25 shows the relationship between number of samples and off-road distance for a sen-
sor with sampling rate = 0.2 samples per second, and maximum range Rj^^ = 500 meters, against
a target moving at v = 15 kph.
If the probability of detection for a single sensor sample is Pj, then the probability a vehicle is
not detected on a single sample is (1 - P^). For a sensor sampling at rate let P{ detect I ?s } be the
probability that it detects the passing vehicle. If the sensor is shown as located in Figure 8.24, then
assuming independence.
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Figure 8.25: Samples as Function of Off-road Distance
P{detect\tJ = \-{\-P^y, (8.2)
where s is given by Equation (8.1). Values of Pjdetect 1 } are shown in Table 8.9 for a sample
size 5=10 with probabilities of detection ranging from 0. 1 to 0.9. It is clear that even at a distance
near the maximum sensor range, the overall probability of detection is high, even for low values










Table 8.9: Sensor P{detect } as a function of
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Typically, TCTs do not travel at speeds greater than v = 60 kph. A graph illustrating the num-
ber of samples per sensor as a function of off-road distance and target speed is shown for distances
of zero to R^^ and speeds from 5 to 60 kph in Figure 8.26.
Number of Samples as Function of
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Figure 8.26: Samples vs. 0££-road Distance vs. Speed
The curve drops to zero at an off-road distance equal to the sensor's maximum range for obvious
reasons. Clearly, in most cases there are more than enough samples for a single sensor to warrant
the assumption that any target present is always detected. The exception is for extremely poor sen-
sors, placed near the maximum range from the road against high-speed targets. But, since this anal-
ysis concentrates on the "Steel Rattler" type of sensor, this case does not apply.
Sensor technology is represented by Pj,
^^ax h- On the other hand, the operational char-
acteristics of vehicle speed and off-road sensor distance are represented by v and d^. Combining
Equations (8. 1) and (8.2) results in an expression for the probability of detection for a given sensor
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Detection probability versus off-road spacing is plotted for several values of in Figure 8.27.
P VS. OfT-Road Distance
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Figure 8.27: Pd«tact ^ Function of Off-road Dlsteuice
In every case the Pdetect drops to zero at - /?max' ^ this reduces the effective sensor range to
nil.
Figure 8.28 provides an alternate way of analyzing this relationship. It shows the maximum al-
lowable off-road distance, d^, such that the probability of detection is at least 0.95, as a function of
the single sample probability of detection, P^.
Maximum Off-Road Distance vs P
,
to achieve P = 0.95
I"
. ()
Figure 8.28: Meucimum Off-road Distance vs.
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The sensors illustrated in these examples pale in comparison to the "Steel Rattler" type of sen-
sor, yet still produce exceptional probabilities of detection. The "Steel Rattler" is advertised to
have a sample rate, = 0.2 samples per sec. and a probability of detection, = 0.95 (Ref. [14]).
These values make the probability of target detection virtually one through its entire range. Here-
after, because of the sensor's sample rate and maximum range, a vehicle is assumed to be detected
with probability one.
8.2.3 Probability of Identification
In the previous section, the analysis of sensor detection indicates that a single sensor has nearly
certain probability of detecting a vehicle moving along a road at a reasonable speed. The difficulty
for the theater commander lies in determining when to commit scarce attack assets to prosecute a
vehicle identified as a TCT based on data provided exclusively by ground sensors. The following
discussion again assumes an array is comprised of n "Steel Rattler" type sensors, each of which
relays a vehicle identification only once, at the closest point of approach, as it passes through the
sensor's range. This identification is based on matching acoustic characteristics with an on-board
signature file loaded prior to sensor deployment.
For each sensor in an array of size n, recall from Section 8.2.1, Definition 6 that
/, = Pi Sensor indicates a TCT, given a TCT is present}, and
/o = P{ Sensor indicates a TCT, given no TCT is present}.
Throughout this paper it is assumed that the sensor can discriminate between TCTs and other
vehicles, so /i > /q. Let be the probability that an arbitrarily chosen vehicle traveling the road is
a TCT (i.e. is the fraction of vehicles that are TCTs).
The general formulation of probability of identification can be derived from Bayes' Rule and
the Law of Total Probability. In the decision model described later in Section 8.3 the possible de-
cision alternatives are to take action against a vehicle identified as a TCT, or take no action. The
decision to take action is made when the theater commander has observed the number of sensors
out of the entire array that indicate a TCT is present. Thus, the required identification probability
to be used in the objective(Loss) function is P{TCT \k/n}, the probability that the detected vehicle
is a TCT, given that exactly k out of n sensors in the array indicate it is. Assuming that the outputs
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of the array sensors are conditionally independent given the vehicle type, the decision probability
is given by
P{TCT\k/n} = ^-^ —7
/ (1-/,)" /'. + /o(l-/o)''
(8.3)
To demonstrate the use of Equation (8.3), suppose there is an array of n = 3 sensors along a
road with a TCT population of = 0.25. The sensors are identical with /, = 0.80 and /o = 0.15.
Table 8.10 shows the probability that a detected target is a TCT given kof n sensors indicate that






Table 8.10: P{TCT} Example Summary
The interested reader can find a more in-depth discussion of the derivation of Equation (8.3) in Ap-
pendix E.
8.2.4 Measures of Effectiveness
The theater commander must weigh all possible outcomes to arrive at his optimal policy. It is
clear that this necessitates a common measure of effectiveness (MOE) used throughout the analy-
ses. Possible candidate MOE's include the probability of an array correctly identifying a target and
the loss incurred by acting incorrectly based on an array forecast. The former is maximized and
the latter minimized.
Both of the above MOE's are used in this paper because they are intertwined. The best array
size is achieved by optimizing the probability of correct identification subject to constraints on the
number of sensors, available intelligence, and potential array sites. Given the optimal size, the
incurred loss MOE is used to determine the theater commander's decision policy. This relationship
is made clear in Section 8.3.
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8.2.5 Common Model Assumptions
Before the models for optimal sensor deployment are introduced, it is necessary to make some
assumptions about the environment in which the problem is to be solved. The following assump-
tions hold true for both models used in the analysis of sensor configuration. First, there must be a
finite number of sensors available to a theater commander for his area of responsibility. The em-
ployment of these sensors, however, is left to his discretion. If reality indicates that sensors are
abundant, then the above constraint can be thought of as a logistical limit to the maximum number
in theater at a given time. Next, it is imperative that the intelligence community be able to evaluate
or estimate the fraction of vehicles in the area of responsibility believed to be TCTs. This assump-
tion varies slightly between the two models, as shown in the following subsection. It is not imper-
ative that the intelligence specialists give an exact percentage. Because the optimization is
performed through a sensitivity analysis, an approximate range is sufficient and can be calculated
from the enemy order of battle (OOB). Finally, as Model 2 shows, the optimization is best per-
formed with a specific theater in mind. In this case, the number of arrays desired is an input value,
and would not make sense otherwise. These simple assumptions set the stage for the two decision
models below.
Model 1 Introduction
The first model is representative of the current, automatic "decision making" in which one
good decision is assumed to be the answer to all problems. It is included in this paper as a com-
parison to Model 2, which provides a response that changes with the specific theater, and is rec-
ommended. With the common assumptions above, the theater commander must choose n, the
number of sensors in every array. Let be the number of sensors available and let A be the number
of candidate array sites. Then, An < N. The value of n may come from some tactical publication,
a rule of thumb, or a hunch. In Model 1 , n is chosen mathematically by dividing the number of sen-
sors available by the number of array sites, and rounding down to the next lowest integer. Thus,
arithmetic means. A significant drawback of this method is that sensors for additional arrays may
. Since all of the arrays are of equal size, the optimal solution may be found directly by
not be available later in the conflict. Summarizing, in Model 1 the problem is to specify locations
86
in the theater commander's AOR at which arrays should be placed. Array size is the direct result
of distributing the available sensors equally among the locations.
Model 2 Introduction
The second model presents a more pragmatic, yet flexible approach to the sensor array prob-
lem. It uses the power of information gathered by intelligence analysts on the best candidate array
sites for a given theater. In addition to a fixed A^, it is assumed that a reasonable number of pro-
spective sites has been chosen by professionals in the intelligence or special operations communi-
ties. In this case, the value n = - may not represent the optimal array size for a given location.
_
A J
In fact, roads with differing fractions of TCT traffic are expected to be best covered by arrays of
differing size. Since the array positions are chosen in advance, it is further assumed that some es-
timate ofTCT traffic can be made for each road to be seeded. Let / be one of the roads to be seeded
with an array. Further, let P^(/) be the fraction of traffic along road / comprised of TCTs. Then
there is a specific n,* corresponding to each Pj^(i). For each of these A arrays there will be an op-
timal policy which dictates when the theater commander should commit an attack asset to a target.
Figure 8.29 illustrates the general problem flow and the solutions obtained. Section 8.2 has in-
troduced material above the dashed line, including model inputs and primary outputs of and k*.
Inputs include the maximum number of sensors available,
, the number of candidate array sites,
A, and the estimated TCT fraction of the population, P^.(0 on each road /. Section 8.3 demonstrates
solutions to the problems displayed below the dashed line. A brief sojourn above the line gives
definitive solutions for the n,* and /c,* introduced in this section. Next, using the theater command-
er's maximum desired reporting time for the entire array, /r, an inter-sensor spacing, d, is deter-
mined. As an aside, these values may be combined to evaluate P^, the probability that the entire
array is compromised given a single sensor is found. With the array size, policy and spacing found,
the theater commander must now weight the array attributes of reporting, compromise, and coun-
termeasures in accordance with his own view of the tactical situation. From these inputs the opti-
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For reasons both tactical and financial, much emphasis is placed on the efficiency and reliabil-
ity of the information reported by the ground sensors. With a finite number of sensors available,
it is imperative that the arrays be configured so as to produce the most reliable forecast to the the-
ater commander at the minimum unit cost.
Before continumg, it is necessary to introduce the problem to be solved by the models. In some
specific theater, there is a network of roads along which time critical traffic, as well as normal ci-
vilian traffic, is known to travel. The fraction of vehicular traffic that is TCT is P^, and the fraction
along a specific road / of interest is P^ii), i = 1,2,...,A. Further, the theater commander has been
allocated N unattended ground sensors to locate and identify the TCT traffic, to be deployed at his
discretion. Let these sensors have performance characteristics of/i = 0.80 and/o = 0.15, as de-
scribed previously. Further, it is assumed that hostilities have erupted, so the "cost" of mis-iden-
tifying an actual TCT is r, = 2 and the "cost" of a false alarm is r2 = 1 . That is, a leaker is twice as
costly as a false alarm. . Using this model, the following discussion details methods for determining
the optimal array size, spacing and deployment pattern for the two models specified in
Section 8.2.5 (p. 86).
8.3.2 Array Size
1. Model 1
The array size in Model 1 is the same for all locations and is predetermined to be /i. This n is




is the number of sensors available. With the array size fixed, the sensitivity analysis consists of
finding the optimal policy as a function of the overall TCT population in the theater. Let fc, be the
minimum number of sensors indicating a vehicle is a TCT on road / required for the theater com-
mander to commit an attack asset. The or more of n policy defined in Section 8.2.3, may be
found by solving the nonlinear program for each road, /:
Minimize lj{n, kj )
subject to
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1 < A:, < n,
kj Integer
i = 1, 2,..., A,
where /,(«, it, ) is the expected loss function derived in Appendix F, and shown below as
Equation (8.4).
/,(«,/:,) = r^Bik,-\-n,f^)P,(i) + r,B(k,-\;n,fo){\-PAi))- (8-4)
In this eqation the binomial distribution function ^ 1 - /o)" ^ abbreviated as B(k', n,/o).
Optimum k* values for varying and array sizes n are shown in Table 8. 11 for arrays up to
size n= 10.
Array Size n
P. 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
0.10 2 2 3 3 4 4 5 5 6
0.20 2 2 3 3 4 4 5 5 6
0.30 2 2 3 3 4 4 5 5
0.40 2 2 3 3 4 4 5 5
0.50 2 2 3 3 4 4 5 5
0.60 2 2 2 3 3 4 4 5
0.70 1 2 2 3 3 4 4 5
0.80 1 1 2 2 2 3 3 4
Table 8.11: Model 1 Optimal Policies
For example, if the theater commander is allotted N= \2 UGS for his AOR consisting of A =
3 array sites, then he should deploy three arrays each of size n = 4. His intelligence team estimates
the fraction of vehicles which are TCT's on the three roads are P^(\) = 0.30, P^(2) = 0. 10 and P^(3)
= 0.20. Therefore, he knows from Table 8.1 1 that he should prosecute the target only if = 2,
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ki = 3 and ^3* = 3 or more of the four sensors in a given array identify the target as a TCT. These
results are summarized in Table 8.12.
Array n
1 0.30 4 2
2 0.10 4 3
3 0.20 4 3
Table 8.12: Model 1 Example Results
The commander knows that this policy will minimize losses due to leakers and false alarms, there-
by optimizing his asset allocation.
2. Model 2
Array size is the essence of the problem for Model 2. Remember that each array potentially
has a different number of sensors based on the fraction of TCT's on the specified road, PJ^i) . Let
n^ be the number of sensors used at location /, and let A., be the traffic flow rate along road / mea-
sured in vehicles per hour. In this case, the only restrictions on the n, are that they be integers, that
X«, ^ A^, and that each prospective location has a deployed array of at least one. This leads directly









\<kj<nj, 7 = 1, 2, ...,A,
kj, Hj, integers,
where
/,(n,,/:,) = r,5(/:,-l;n,/,)P,(/) + r2fi(A:,-l;n,/o)(l-P,(/)) (8.5)
is the optimal expected loss for array /, derived in Appendix F,
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For example, assume the same theater commander is again allotted N = \2 UGS for his AOR,
which has A = 3 candidate array sites. His intelligence team estimates the fraction of vehicles
which are TCT's on these three roads are P^(\) = 0.30, P,(2) = 0. 1 and P^(3) = 0.20. Additionally,
the flow rates for these roads are estimated at = 1 vehicle per hour, for all /. After solving the
nonlinear integer program outlined above, the optimal array sizes are «i = 3, ^2 =4 and = 5.
The optimal k*, given these are k* = 2, kj* = 3 and k^* =3. These results are summarized in
Table 8.13.
Array «. k;
1 0.30 3 2
2 0.10 4 3
3 0.20 5 3
Table 8.13: Model 2 Example Results
Again, the commander knows that losses due to leakers and false alarms will be minimized if the
k* or more of n* policy indicated is adhered to for a particular array. Given that k* or more do
indicate a TCT, he should prosecute the target, now identified as a TCT, with an available asset.
A comparison of the results reveals the advantages of Model 2 over Model 1 . Continuing with
the assumption that the same three roads were seeded in the given theater of operations gives the
results summarized in Table 8.14. Model 1 determines a k* = 2, k2* = 3 and ^3* = 3 or more of n
= 4 policy, and Model 2 determines the policies summarized in Table 8.13. In both cases the cor-
responding road populations, P^(i), are used for the loss function.
Road
1 2 3 Total
Model 1 0.0930 0.0469 0.0819 0.2218
Model 2 0.1049 0.0469 0.0445 0.1963
Table 8.14: Minimum Expected Loss Comparison
Clearly, even for this small example. Model 2 shows superior performancewhen using twelve sen-
sors for the theater.
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8.3.3 Array Spacing
With the array size and identification policy determined, the next logical question to answer is
how far apart should the sensors of a particular array be spaced, and how far from the road should
they be. The second half of the question is more subjective, and therefore will be addressed first.
In the case of air dropped sensors, it is likely that considerable error will be associated with the
deployment and free-fall of the individual units. In this case, it seems smartest to aim at a position
half of the maximum radius away from the road. Location error in either direction will then still
allow the sensor to function with some or all of its capability. Sensors placed by special operations
units are positioned with a greater degree of accuracy, and will always be within the range of the
sensor's capabilities. Therefore, the off-road distance of the sensor should be left to the discretion
of the insertion team leader, who should receive some training in placement. In general, the dis-
tance should be as close to the road as is operationally possible, without risking compromise of the
sensor or the insertion team.
Inter-sensor spacing is a function of several different factors. Generally, the sensors need to be
close enough to each other that the theater commander can consider the report cycle of all sensors
in an array as a single event. On the other hand, they should be spaced far enough apart to minimize
the likelihood that the entire array is compromised should a single sensor be discovered. Clearly,
the probability that the entire array is compromised increases with decreasing inter-sensor distance.
The goal is to find a middle ground acceptable to the theater commander.
To analyze this relationship, assume the hostile force has found a sensor and will conduct a ran-
dom search of the surrounding area for some time, t, minutes. Then, assuming that m individuals
each search randomly and uniformly at a rate of S m^/second, these individuals cover a total area
of As = Smt m during the search time. Using a standard area search model, the area to be searched
is actually a circle with a radius equal to the distance between the farthest two sensors. This data
is obtained by the enemy observing American standard operating procedures during the conflict,
and correctly estimating n. An upper bound on this radius is found by assuming the sensors are
arrayed in the line pattern configuration and that the sensor initially found is at the end of the line.
This value is easily seen to be radius = d(n-\). Let be the probability an additional array sensor
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is compromised, given that a single sensor has been found. From Random Search Theory, the
probability the hostile force finds one additional sensor in time / is given by see
60Sml
PM) = l-e""^'^"-'^^' (Ref. [13]).
This probability of compromise is shown on the left hand curve in Figure 8.30 for. varying inter-
sensor range, d. Other parameters used in this illustration are:
• « = 4 sensors
• S = 24 rc?l second
• m = 4 searchers
t - 240 minutes




Figure 8.30: Effect of Inter-sensor Range on and Report Time
For example, if four sensors are spaced at an inter-sensor distance oi d = 300 meters, and the
search effort is as indicated as above, then the probability that one additional sensor is discovered
in the allotted search time is Pc(300) = 0.419. Therefore, there is a 41 .9% chance that the searching
party will find one additional sensor in t = 240 minutes. It is important to remember that the values
shown in Figure 8.30 are obtained using the line pattern, and therefore represent an upper bound.
At the same time, the theater commander is awaiting the full report of his array. This time
increases linearly with increasing inter-sensor distance d and is shown as the straight line in
Figure 8.30. This figure assumes that the TCT is traveling at a constant speed, VTCT = 20 kph.
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The graph illustrates two distinct features. The left hand curve depicts the decreasing probability
that the search team compromises an additional sensor in the allotted time as the sensors become
spaced further apart. The linear curve shows the increase in reporting time for the entire array as
this inter-sensor distance increases. These two relations may be combined to obtain the probability
of compromising one or more additional sensors as a function of array reporting time,
PoUr) = \-e ^ ' \ (8.6)
where is the reporting time for the entire array. A plot of for varying /r is shown in
Figure 8.31 for the parameters specified above.








Figure 8.31: as Function of Reporting Speed
It is important to remember that most of the factors involved in this curve are beyond the con-
trol of the theater commander. Placement errors from air drops or hand emplacement can influence
the inter-sensor distance, and the opposing search team's capabilities, size, and available time are
unknowns. The above formulas simply serve as a general reference as to the overall mission ca-
pability of the system using estimated parameters. Table 8.15 gives the inter-sensor range d for
varying array sizes n and maximum reporting times, /r, based on a TCT with estimated speed v =




2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
1 333 167 111 83 67 56 48 42 37
2 667 333 222 167 133 111 95 83 74
3 1000 500 333 250 200 167 143 125 111
4 1333 667 444 333 267 222 190 167 148
5 1667 833 556 417 333 278 238 208 185
6 2000 1000 667 500 400 333 286 250 222
7 2333 1167 778 583 467 389 333 292 259
8 2667 1333 889 667 533 444 381 333 296
9 3000 1500 1000 750 600 500 429 375 333
10 3333 1667 1111 833 667 556 476 417 370
Table 8.15: Inter-sensor Distance (meters) for TCT Speed v = 20 kph
Table 8.15 is based on Equation (8.7) which gives inter-sensor distance in meters as a function





It is important to note that the number of sensors in the array for the look-up tables and for
Equation (8.7) represent only the sensors not making simultaneous reports. In the case where w
sensors report to the theater commander virtually simultaneously, only one of the w is used in com-
puting the array size. This is described further in the following section.
8.3.4 Array Placement Patterns
This section covers the actual geometry of the sensor array as viewed from above. Each of the
four proposed patterns has strengths and weaknesses when evaluated in the areas of reporting time,
compromise and countermeasures as described below.
First, reporting time refers to the speed, in minutes, at which the entire array can deliver n re-
ports to the theater commander. Next, compromise is the probability that additional array sensors
are found given that one has been discovered. Finally, countermeasures refers to the likelihood
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that more than one sensor may be affected if some form ofjamming is used in its proximity. Also
included in this category are environmental effects which may hamper sensor performance, such
as wind gusts or a falling branch.
When seeding a road, sensors spaced equidistant from each other fall into four proposed pat-
terns: the line, the cross-hatch, triples, and the goal post. These are summarized and illustrated in
Figures 8.32 through 8.35, below. In each figure d represents the inter-sensor spacing and d^ the
off-road distance. Larger arrays than those shown can be built by adding two of the above simple




Figure 8.32: Line Pattern
The line pattern is the simplest of the building blocks used for array placement. Sensors are
placed on one side of the road with a constant inter-sensor distance, d meters, and an off-road dis-





Figure 8.33: Cross-Hatch Pattern
The cross-hatch pattern alternates sensors on either side of the road, again with an effective
along-road spacing of d. This pattern would be extremely difficult to deploy from the air. If it be-
came necessary to do so, the aircraft would have to fly along either side of the road on separate
runs, spacing the sensors a distance of 2d meters apart. Again, it would be unlikely that the con-
figuration between the two rows would be properly aligned with this technique. With this in mind,










Figure 8.34: Triples Pattern
The triples pattern combines the line and the cross-hatch patterns. In fact, this pattern could
also be produced with quadruples, or more. Similar deployment problems as with the cross-hatch
are evident here, also. An advantage of the triples pattern is that every 2d meters of TCT transit
there is a simultaneous report from two sensors.






Figure 8.35: Goal Post Pattern
Finally, the goal post pattern is a combination of two line patterns, one on either side of the
road. It can easily be deployed by both land and air forces. The greatest advantage of the goal post,
is that the theater commander receives two sensor reports virtually simultaneously every d meters.
The weakness is that any environmental effects or countermeasures affecting one sensor will prob-
ably also affect its counterpart across the road.
The performance of each of the patterns described above is scored on a scale of one to four and
their relationships are illustrated on a policy diagram. In each case, a higher score is desired. Op-
erationally, scores are obtained from the tactical experience of the theater commander. As an ex-
ample, the author has provided scores for the overall performance of the sensor patterns when
evaluated for reporting speed, likelihood of compromise, and susceptibility to countermeasures or
environmental factors. These values are summarized in Table 8.16.
The triples and goal post patterns score high in the reporting category because two sensors relay








Line 1 1 3 1.67
Cross-hatch 1 4 4 3.00
Triples 3 3 2
Goal Post 4 2 1 2.33
Table 8.16: Placement Pattern Summary
porting time of the array. On the other hand, this arrangement could lead to greater susceptibility
to countermeasures or compromise, and so they score lower in this attribute. The cross-hatch pat-
tern scores high against both countermeasures and compromise because the inter-sensor distance
on one side of the road is 2d, or twice the actual inter-sensor distance. However, a report is only
received every div time units rather than 2 reports every div time units, and therefore a lower re-
porting score.
The last column represents the relative values of the patterns if all three attributes are equally
weighted, an unlikely occurrence for any decision maker. Therefore, a sensitivity analysis of the
weights was performed using the ranks in Table 8.16. The policy space of the relative weights of
the different categories is shown in Figure 8.36 where w, and W2 represent the relative weights as-
sociated with reporting time and compromise. The sum of the weights on reporting time, compro-
mise, and countermeasures is equal to one, or ^ w, = 1 .
i = I
The absence of the line pattern altogether is due to its domination by the cross-hatch pattern in
the feasible region. For theater commanders who weigh reporting time heavily (greater than 0.5),
goal post is the pattern of choice. Note that for a small range of the weights triples should be cho-
sen, for example when there are approximately equal weights on reporting time and compromise
and little weight on counter-measures. If all attributes are equally weighted, the diagram indicates
cross-hatch should be chosen as was indicated in Table 8.16.
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Reporting Time Weight, W|
Figure 8.36: Placement Preference Regions
8.3.5 Conclusions
This section is best summarized by returning to Figure 8.29, reprinted below as Figure 8.37.
This flow diagram may be used as a checklist for the theater commander when deploying his forces
to minimize the TCT threat. The inputs include the array stockpile size, the candidate array sites,
vehicle flow rates, and corresponding TCT population fractions for those sites. From the nonlinear
program specified in Section 8.3.2 an optimal array size and kj are obtained. Next, the theater
commander must decide on his maximum array reporting time and estimated TCT velocity along
the seeded road. These estimates, along with the array size above will yield the recommended in-
ter-sensor distance when applied to Equation (8.7). With reasonable estimates of enemy capabili-
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ty, the probability of compromise may also be obtained at this point using Equation (8.6). Finally,
the decision maker must prioritize the relative weights of reporting time, compromise, and coun-
termeasures. These weights, when applied to Figure 8.36, return the optimal array pattern. There-
fore, the complicated task of choosing the optimal array for a given set of roads in a theater of
operations has been reduced to three simple decisions for the theater commander.
8.4 Array Location
8.4.1 Introduction
This section addresses the specific location of the array along a chosen road to maximize the
array's strengths and minimize the chance of compromise in accordance with the theater com-
mander's mission priorities. It is assumed that the intelligence community is responsible for
choosing the particular roads to be seeded based on TCT traffic, mission criticality, and probability
of mission success. The specific areas of placement considered are straight road segments, inter-
sections, and geographic choke points. Each is described, then evaluated by sensitivity analysis to
determine which best suits the theater commander's assessment of the tactical picture.
8.4.2 General Placement Concerns
Before the different possible locations are measured against one another, it is first necessary to
determine the attributes most important to mission success. These attributes, placement and com-
promise, information, and tactical potential, are then used to evaluate the relative strength of each
location. The performance of arrays in each of the possible locations described below is scored on
a scale of one to four and their relationships are illustrated in a policy diagram. In each case, a
higher score is desired.
Placement involves the ease with which the array may be deployed by SOF or by air. Place-
ment not only includes the physical difficulty in laying the sensors, but also the likelihood that the
insertion team is discovered before the array is completely deployed and camouflaged. Placement
is grouped with compromise because they share the same strengths and weaknesses, thereby mak-
ing their scores equal and uninteresting. That said, compromise, unlike the array spacing analysis,





/*,(() = TCT population fraction
on road i




n =Optimal array size
k =Optimal array policy
Figure 8.37: Array Deployment Checklist
ed by hostile forces. This is based on the assumption that the opponent knows the United States is
using ground sensors for cueing strike assets, and is sweeping areas deemed most likely to be har-
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boring arrays. Information is obtained from the raw data produced by the array. This includes both
positive and negative information, which are defined as the presence of aTCT, and the lack ofTCT
contact, respectively. The tactical potential score is based on the clarity of the information received
by the theater commander from the array. Specifically, the information attribute addresses the abil-
ity to transfer data to an airborne strike asset. Locations which allow an airborne platform to easily
locate and positively correlate a vehicle with the array output are high on the scoring scale. Those
that provide confusing or ambiguous information score low. The three attributes are weighted in
relative importance by the theater commander and the optimal array location is read from the pol-
icy graph later in this section.
8.4.3 Straight Road Segment
Locating an array along a straight road segment is probably the simplest, and most practical
insertion technique. Since straight roads are far more abundant than choke points or intersections,
it is a simple matter for a trained unit to choose an easily accessible section of road, deploy the array
and withdraw. Similarly, air-dropped arrays are equally effective along any section of a straight
road, and the exact location may be chosen to minimize the possibility of action by hostile forces,
both against the array and the deploying aircraft. Because road segments are so abundant, forces
sweeping for arrays will have little success. It would be a difficult task, without some kind of cue-
ing to isolate a particular section of straight road along which to conduct a search for an array. For
this reason, it is hypothesized that enemy search forces will concentrate on sweeping choke points
and intersections rather than on open roads. The geometry of road segments precludes excessive
traffic, and the specific volume of traffic is a function of the road chosen, not the segment. Finally,
road segments provide a clear tactical picture in that there is only one entry and one egress from a
road segment. Therefore, a cued air asset should easily locate and visually identify a TCT traveling
down a straight road. The scores for the straight road segment for the above attributes are shown
in Table 8.17.








Table 8.17: Straight Road Segment
8.4.4 Intersection
Intersections naturally attract significant attention due to the seemingly endless possibilities
they provide. A TCT is easily tracked until it reaches an intersection. Then, unless each of the
exiting segments contains an array, it could simply vanish from the tactical picture of the theater
commander. Similarly, if two arrays on opposite sides of an intersection gain contact in a reason-
able time increment, who can positively state that there is only one TCT operating in the area? Per-
haps the original TCT turned, and a second unit is passing the other sensor. These problems plague
road intersections and may not be easily answered. The only definite solution is the use of a SOF
team at the intersection to visually identify each TCT as it passes.
The general business of an intersection automatically makes array placement by SOF team
more difficult. Although not all intersections are busy, they are by nature more traveled than
straight road segments. Following the above hypopaper that enemy sweeping action will be con-
centrated at intersections and choke points, makes arrays placed at intersections more subject to
compromise. Further, the likelihood that a given intersection is searched grows with the relative
importance of that intersection as a military transit hub. Obviously, intersections near to forward
assembly areas will be swept regularly. The real strength of intersections is the volume of infor-
mation they produce. The sheer amount of traffic flowing through a busy intersection provides an
excellent sample of vehicle population of all types, TCT and otherwise. A seeded intersection with
no TCT contact provides as much, if not more, information as a positive contact along a straight
road. The negative information associated with the intersection implies not only that the intersec-
tion sees no TCT traffic, but also that the road segments adjacent are not used by TCT's. This can
significantly reduce the overall search area for other assets and can help determine array locations
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for future array deployment sites. Tactically an intersection provides little aid in the prosecution
of TCT's by air assets. A TCT passing through an intersection is generally lost until it passes a
more specific identification point, such as a choke point or an array along a straight road segment.
Array output is generally too vague to determine which branch the TCT took when exiting the in-








8.4.5 Geographic choke point
Geographic choke points share the best and the worst characteristics of the above two locations.
Placement is difficult due to the very nature of the choke point. Entry and egress to the area may
be difficult, and it may be well patrolled because of its significance. Additionally, since the oppos-
ing forces must also realize this area is a choke point, it is a very likely candidate for sweeps, mak-
ing the risk of compromise greater. With less area to search, arrays in these areas are at high risk.
Depending on the particular choke point, information provided may be quite plentiful. If the area
is one of few allowing passage between hostile depots and their forward staging areas, much infor-
mation will be available. Similarly, a bridge or causeway frequently used to move military vehi-
cles is a good target. Finally, the tactical use of a geographic choke point is incomparable. A
targets moving into a choke point is restricted in movement and may be waited for as it egresses.
This would allow an easy transition from ground information to air. The attribute scores for the
geographic choke points are given in Table 8.19.
8.4.6 Sensitivity Analysis
A summary of the overall value of the different location areas when evaluated for placement







Table 8.19: Geographic Choke Point
cates the value of the location areas with all attributes weighted equally. Note that each area totals
to a value of two. This implies that each of the areas has strengths and weaknesses in the attributes
evaluated, and that the most suitable location depends greatly on the preferences of the theater
commander.






Straight Road 1 2 3 2
Intersection 3 1 2 2
Choke Point 2 3 1 2
Table 8.20: Location Area Summary
The policy space of the relative weights of the different categories is shown in Figure 4.1,
where w, and W2 represent the relative weights associated with information and tactical potential.
The sum of the weights on information, tactical potential, and placement and compromise is equal
to one, or ^ w, = 1 .
; = 1
For example, the intelligence analyst, who is most concerned with information flow, may con-
sider the information attribute paramount while having little concern for the tactical potential of
the array. In his case, the array is best located at an intersection. On the other hand, the strike pilot
is only interested in his ability to localize a target identified by the array. His choice would be for
the choke point. The final extreme is represented by the SOF planner concerned with providing
useful information without compromising the insertion team. His policy of choice would be the
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Information Weight, w.
Figure 8.38: Placement Location Preference Regions
straight road. The diagram also provides a representation of the case illustrated in Table 8.20. This
decision maker, who weighs all attributes equally, draws no information from the policy diagram
8.5 Conclusions
Used effectively, unattended ground sensors are a significant asset in the theater commander's
TBMD toolbox. The key to accomplishing the optimal use of this resource, and those that rely
upon it, is a step by step plan to follow for their employment. This paper provides the checklist to
be used by theater commanders to maximize ballistic missile defense at minimal cost.
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8.5.1 The Process
The process begins with a specific theater with an overlying road grid. The theater commander
is allotted unattended ground sensors to be deployed at his discretion. The intelligence shop,
after careful analysis selects A candidate array sites based on time critical target traffic and mission
criticality. Provided with the list of sites is a corresponding P^, the fraction of vehicular traffic
along that segment believed to be time critical and X,, , estimated vehicle flow rate.
The theater commander then enlists a member of his staff to run the optimization given in
Section 8.3 to minimize his expected losses based on the above parameters. The nonlinear pro-
gram produces an optimal array size, n*, and prosecution policy, k*, for each of the A sites. If non-
linear programming software is unavailable. Appendix B may be used in which the maximum
allowable probability of a leaker is compared to that of a false alarm to obtain an n . Appendix C
then provides the optimal policy on prosecution using the array sizes specified in Appendix B.
These look up tables are generated by enumerating the possible combinations of n and k, then
choosing that which produces the minimal loss by Equation (8.5). It is important to note that the
look up table procedure may not provide the actual optimal solution for the case where is limited.
The look up tables merely supply the optimal array size for discrete roads, without limiting the total
count of sensors deployed.
With the array sizes and policies determined, the next step is to find the inter-sensor spacing to
be used given that it is desirous to minimize the reporting time between adjacent sensors and also
minimize the likelihood that the entire array is compromised by hostile forces. Appendix D pro-
vides look up tables for sensor distance based on array size, estimated TCT speed, and the maxi-
mum reporting time for the array. When entering the look up tables, it is important to subtract one
for each pair of sensors that report virtually simultaneously because of their pattern orientation, as
described in Section 8.3.4.
The geometry of the pattern is devised through the theater commander's relative weight of re-
porting time, compromise, and susceptibility to counter-measures. These weights are applied to
Figure 8.36 and the optimal deployment pattern is read from the graph. To maximize the array ef-
fectiveness according to this theater commander's desires, sensors should be placed in the appro-
priate pattern with the spacing determined above.
108
After the specifics of the A arrays are complete, it is time to begin mission planning. The the-
ater commander must meet with his intelligence analysts and operational planners to determine the
relative weights of the factors affecting array locations, placement and compromise, information,
and tactical potential. These weights are then applied to Figure 8.38 to ascertain the type of loca-
tion most beneficial to the overall effort, yet in an area conducive to array deployment. These lo-
cations are broken into the categories of choke points, straight roads, and intersections.
8.5.2 Summary
As budgets continue to shrink and small theater actions become more common, optimal use of
available assets exponentially increases in importance. The Vietnam era tradition of attrition war-
fare has given way to today's cost effective battlefield upon which fewer soldiers, and a large num-
ber of less expensive sensors are placed. This is the essence of Libicki's technological "Mesh"
in which many small sensors perform all the data collection with the added advantage of being too
numerous to kill, and thereby more robust. In fact, the role of unattended ground sensors can be
summed up in that
being there is necessarily a prerequisite to seeing there, and not necessarily a pre-
requisite to hitting there if the range set of one's own weapons is sufficiently dense.
(Ref. [11])
Judiciously placed sensors, combined with lethal UAV's, artillery, or theater missiles would
go a long way toward this vision. This document begins to satisfy the first portion of that equation.
Theater ballistic missiles pose an ominous threat to any theater commander in the battlefields
of the future. It is only through the judicious use of all available assets that decisive action may be
taken. Properly employed unattended ground sensors provide a cost effective and reliable option
to assess the theater throughout the conflict.
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APPENDIX A. THE "STEEL RATTLER" SENSOR
An excellent example of the advances in sensor technology is the "Steel Rattler"
unattended ground sensor. The capabilities of both the sensor units and their deployment
systems continue to evolve, but this appendix serves as a current-day ability profile. The
sensors were designed and tested by Sandia National Laboratories in Albuquerque, New
Mexico, from which most of this information was obtained. Further data was provided by
Central MASINT Technology of Florida.
The "Steel Rattler" is a multi-component unattended ground sensor system with
seismic, acoustic and infrared detection and identification capability. The seismic/ acoustic
array first detects a target of interest and attempts to match its signature with a pre-loaded
signature database. The time of detection, array position, and identification are sent via
satellite link to a fusion center. If a positive identification is not possible, the seismic/
acoustic array "wakes up" the infrared sensor which is positioned further along the
expected route of travel. The infrared sensor transmits a still photograph of the target of
interest at its closest point of approach to the fusion center via a satellite link where a
system operator must visually identify the contact. If the seismic/ acoustic array makes an
identification, the infrared sensor will never be activated. There is no ability to turn on the
infrared to confirm the sensor's identification. Similarly, if the seismic/ acoustic array fails
to detect a target of interest, the infrared sensor has no means to detect on its own. It is
possible to position a seismic/ acoustic array on either side of the infrared sensor to detect
targets moving in either direction.
The seismic/ acoustic array field of regard is 360°. Therefore, the search area for
the seismic/ acoustic array is circular with a radius equal to the maximum seismic/ acoustic
range centered at the array position. This maximum range is approximately 500 meters,
depending on the specific terrain in which the array is placed. For the purpose of this
analysis, all sensors are assumed to be "cookie-cutter," implying that there is no chance of
detecting a target outside the specified maximum range. In reality, some detections may
occur in this region.
The "Steel Rattler" can be described as a system performing spot searches on a
recurring basis. The actual sensor sample rate is once per second, but a maximum of five
seconds are required to report a detection to the fusion center. For this reason, a five
second sample rate is used in the model analysis of Section 8.3. The time required to check
a target signature against the database is less than one second, and therefore considered
negligible for this thesis (Ref[14]).
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APPENDIX B. SIZE LOOK-UP TABLES
The tables in this appendix are based on the k* or more of «* policy given in
Section 8.2 and the derivation in Appendix F. They are subdivided by the relative values
of a leaker versus a false alarm, given as r, and respectively. Each table has a
corresponding value which is the fraction of traffic assumed to be TCTs. The sensors
are assumed identical with /, = 0.80 and = 0.15, as previously described. The table is
entered with a row value of the maximum allowable probability of prosecuting a non-TCT,
and a column value of the maximum allowable probability of a leaker.
Table entries are obtained by enumerating possible values of n for the appropriate
probabilities of a leaker and of a false alarm, and choosing the minimum array size. To
summarize this procedure, let k(n) be the optimal policy which minimizes l(n,k). Further,
let
a{n, k) be the probability of a leaker, P(Leaker), and
P(n, k) be the probability of prosecuting a non-TCT, P(Hit F.T.).
The optimal array size may then be obtained from the math program given by
Minimize n
s.t.
a{n,k(n))< Max. allowable P(Leaker)




For Example, assume leakers and false alarms have relative values of r, = 1 and
= 1, respectively. Now assume that the theater commander wants to know the optimal
array size given that he will allow a 5% leaker probability and a 20% chance of prosecuting
a non-TCT. The intelligence shop estimates that 20% of vehicle traffic are TCT's, Then,
from the = 0.4 Table in Section B, the optimal array size is n* = 3.
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A. "Leaker," /*, = 1 and "False alarm," = 1
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9 7 7 7 7 7
6 5 3 3 3 3
6 4 11 11
6 2 11 11
6 2 1111
6 2 11 11
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Max P (Leaker)







8 7 7 7 7 7
8 4 3 3 3 3
8 4 3 1 1 1
8 2 2 1 1 1
8 2 2 1 1 1
8 2 2 1 1 1
Px = 0.7
Max P (Leaker)







8 5 5 5 5 5
7 4 3 1 1 1
7 2 2 1 1 1
7 2 2 1 1 1
7 2 2 1 1 1
7 2 2 1 1 1
Px = 0.8
Max P (Leaker)







8 6 6 6 6 6
5 4 4 4 1 1
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3 2 2 2 1 1
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B. "Leaker," r, = 2 and "False alarm," = 1
Px= 0.1
Max P (Leaker)
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6 4 11 11
6 2 11 11
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6 2 11 11
Px = 0.6
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C. "Leaker," r, = 1 and "False alarm," = 2
Px= 0.1
Max P (Leaker)
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6 2 11 11
6 2 11 11
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7 4 2 2 1 1
7 4 2 2 1 1
7 4 2 2 1 1
7 4 2 2 1 1
Px = 0.3
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8 4 3 1 1 1
8 2 2 1 1 1
8 2 2 1 1 1
8 2 2 1 1 1
8 2 2 1 1 1
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Max P (Leaker)







8 5 5 5 5 5
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APPENDIX C. POLICY LOOK-UP TABLES
The tables in this appendix give the optimal k* of the or more of /i" policy
described in Section 8.3. They are subdivided by the relative values of a leaker versus a
false alarm, given as r, and rj respectively. Each table has a corresponding value which
is the local fraction of traffic assumed to be TCT. The sensors are assumed identical with
/, = 0.80 and fg = 0. 15. Table values are obtained by fixing and n, then enumerating
values of the loss function (Equation (8.5)) for varying k. The k corresponding to the
minimum loss function value is k*.
For Example, assume leakers and false alarms have relative values of r, = 1 and
= 2, respectively. Now assume that the theater commander wants to know the optimal k or
more of n* policy given an array size of n = 8 sensors. The intelligence shop estimates that
40% of vehicle traffic are TCT's. Then, from the P^ = 0.4 column in Section B, the
optimal value of k isk*= 4. That is, the contact at the sensor should be prosecuted as a
TCT if four or more of the eight sensors indicate that it is a TCT.
A. Leaker," r, = 1 and "False alarm," rj= 1
0.10 P. = 0.20 P.= 0.30
n k* n k* n k*
1 1 1 1 1 1
2 2 2 2 2 2
3 3 3 2 3 2
4 3 4 3 4 3
5 4 5 3 5 3
6 4 6 4 6 4
7 4 7 4 7 4
8 5 8 5 8 4
9 5 9 5 9 5
10 6 10 6 10 5
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= 0.40 X 0.50 0.60






2 2 2 1 1
3 2 3 2 3 2
4 2 4 2 A4
5 3 5 oo b od
6 3 6 oO D Q
7 4 7 4 7 4
8 4 8 4 8 4
9 5 9 5 9 5
10 5 10 5 10 5
0.70 P. = 0.80 P.=^ 0.90
n k* n n k*
1 1 1 1 1 1
2 1 2 1 2 1
3 2 3 1 3 1
4 2 4 2 4 2
5 3 5 2 5 2
6 3 6 3 6 3
7 3 7 3 7 3
8 4 8 4 8 4
9 4 9 4 9 4
10 5 10 5 10 4
"Leaker," r, = 2 and "False alarm," rj = 1
0.10 = 0.20 0.30
n k* n k* n k*
1 1 1 1 1 1
2 2 2 2 2 1
3 2 3 2 3 2
4 3 4 3 4 2
5 3 5 3 5 3
6 4 6 4 6 3
7 4 7 4 7 4
8 5 8 4 8 4
9 5 9 5 9 5
10 6 10 5 10 5
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p - 40 P - 50 P - 0.60
n If
*K n K n
1 1 1 1 1 1
2 1 2 1 2 1
3 2 3 2 3 2
4 2 4 2 4 2
5 3 5 3 5 2
6 3 6 3 6 3
1 7 7/ oo
8 4 8 4 8 4
9 5 9 4 9 4
10 5 10 5 10 5
Px = 0.70 P. = 0.80 Px = 0.90
n k* n /f* n If*
1 1 1 1 1 1
2 1 2 1 2 1
3 1 3 1 3 1
4 2 4 2 4 1
5 2 5 2 5 2
6 3 6 3 6 2
7 3 7 3 7 2
8 4 8 4 8 3
9 4 9 4 9 3
10 5 10 4 10 4
"Leaker," r, = 1 and "False alarm," = 2
0.10 P. = 0.20
''x
= 0.30
n k* n k* n k*
1 1 1 1 1 1
2 2 2 2 2 2
3 3 3 3 3 2
4 3 4 3 4 3
5 4 5 3 5 3
6 4 6 4 6 4
7 5 7 4 7 4
8 5 8 5 8 5
9 6 9 5 9 5
10 6 10 6 10 6
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p. = 0.40 0.50 0.60
n k* n k* n k*
1 1 1 1 1 1
2 2 2 2 2 2
3 2 3 2 3 2
4 3 4 3 4 2
5 3 5 3 5 3
6 4 6 4 6 3
7 4 7 4 7 4
8 5 8 4 8 4
9 5 9 5 9 5
10 5 10 5 10 5
0.70 P. = 0.80 0.90
n k* n k* n k*
1 1 1 1 1 1
2 1 2 1 2 1
3 2 3 2 3 1
4 2 4 2 4 2
5 3 5 3 5 2
6 3 6 3 6 3
7 4 7 4 7 3
8 4 8 4 8 4
9 5 9 4 9 4
10 5 10 5 10 5
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APPENDIX D. SPACING LOOK-UP TABLES
The tables in this appendix give the inter-sensor distance for array sensors as
described in Section 8.3.3. Most of the factors affecting sensor spacing are beyond the
control of the theater commander, so these values are based on some simple assumptions.
It is important to note that the number of sensors in the array for the look-up represent only
the sensors not making simultaneous reports. In the case where w sensors report to the
theater commander virtually simultaneously, only one of the w is used in computing the
array size. Table values are obtained from Equation (8.7) with the assumption that TCT
velocity is constant through the array. A separate table is provided for speeds varying from
5 to 55 kph, and for one to ten sensor array sizes.
For Example, assume that the theater commander wants to know the optimal inter-
sensor distance given his array size ofn = 8 sensors. The intelligence shop estimates that
TCT's along this stretch of road travel at approximately v = 30 kph and the theater
commander wants his full array to report in no more than t^ = 6 minutes. Then, from the
"Speed V = 30 kph" table, reading then = 8 column and the t^ = 6 minutes yields a
maximum sensor spacing of d = 375 meters.
Distance for TCT Speed v = 5 kph
(min)
Array Size, n
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1
1 83 42 28 21 17 14 12 10 9
2 167 83 56 42 33 28 24 21 19
3 250 125 83 63 50 42 36 31 28
4 333 167 111 83 67 56 48 42 37
5 417 208 139 104 83 69 60 52 46
6 500 250 167 125 100 83 71 63 56
7 583 292 194 146 117 97 83 73 65
8 667 333 222 167 133 111 95 83 74
9 750 375 250 188 150 125 107 94 83
1 833 417 278 208 167 139 119 104 93
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Distance for TCT Speed v = 10 kph
(min)
Array Size, n
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1
1 167 83 56 42 33 28 24 21 19
2 333 167 111 83 67 56 48 42 37
3 500 250 167 125 100 83 71 63 56
4 667 333 222 167 133 111 95 83 74
5 833 417 278 208 167 139 119 104 93
6 1000 500 333 250 200 167 143 125 111
7 1167 583 389 292 233 194 167 146 130
8 1333 667 444 333 267 222 190 167 148
9 1500 750 500 375 300 250 214 188 167
1 1667 833 556 417 333 278 238 208 185
Distance for TCT Speed v = 15 kph
(min)
Array Size, n
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1
1 250 125 83 63 50 42 36 31 28
2 500 250 167 125 100 83 71 63 56
3 750 375 250 188 150 125 107 94 83
4 1000 500 333 250 200 167 143 125 111
5 1250 625 417 313 250 208 179 156 139
6 1500 750 500 375 300 250 214 188 167
7 1750 875 583 438 350 292 250 219 194
8 2000 1000 667 500 400 333 286 250 222
9 2250 1125 750 563 450 375 321 281 250
1 2500 1250 833 625 500 417 357 313 278




2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1
1 333 167 111 83 67 56 48 42 37
2 667 333 222 167 133 111 95 83 74
3 1000 500 333 250 200 167 143 125 111
4 1333 667 444 333 267 222 190 167 148
5 1667 833 556 417 333 278 238 208 185
6 2000 1000 667 500 400 333 286 250 222
7 2333 1167 778 583 467 389 333 292 259
8 2667 1333 889 667 533 444 381 333 296
9 3000 1500 1000 750 600 500 429 375 333
1 3333 1667 1111 833 667 556 476 417 370
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Distance for TCT Speed v = 25 kph
(min)
Array Size, n
3w *• s 6 7 8 9 1
1 /I 1 7 ^KJO 11 OC7 1 OA1 U4 ft'3 O 9 fin 4fi
2 07Q 1 R71 D / 1 Oi7 1 1 Q 1 VJ4 y o
3 1 doU ROC /I 1 741/ "31 '3O 1 o ^uo 1 7Q 1 Cfi 1 "301 oy
4 1667 833 556 417 333 278 238 208 185
5 2083 1042 694 521 417 347 298 260 231
6 2500 1250 833 625 500 417 357 313 278
7 2917 1458 972 729 583 486 417 365 324
8 3333 1667 1111 833 667 556 476 417 370
9 3750 1875 1250 938 750 625 536 469 417
1 4167 2083 1389 1042 833 694 595 521 463
Distance for TCT Speed v = 30 kph
Array Size, n
(min) 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1
1 500 250 167 125 100 83 71 63 56
2 1000 500 333 250 200 167 143 125 111
3 1500 750 500 375 300 250 214 188 167
4 2000 1000 667 500 400 333 286 250 222
5 2500 1250 833 625 500 417 357 313 278
6 3000 1500 1000 750 600 500 429 375 333
7 3500 1750 1167 875 700 583 500 438 389
8 4000 2000 1333 1000 800 667 571 500 444
9 4500 2250 1500 1125 900 750 643 563 500
1 5000 2500 1667 1250 1000 833 714 625 556
Distance for TCT Speed v = 35 kph
(min)
Array Size, n
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1
1 583 292 194 146 117 97 83 73 65
2 1167 583 389 292 233 194 167 146 130
3 1750 875 583 438 350 292 250 219 194
4 2333 1167 778 583 467 389 333 292 259
5 2917 1458 972 729 583 486 417 365 324
6 3500 1750 1167 875 700 583 500 438 389
7 4083 2042 1361 1021 817 681 583 510 454
8 4667 2333 1556 1 167 933 778 667 583 519
9 5250 2625 1750 1313 1050 875 750 656 583
1 5833 2917 1944 1458 1167 972 833 729 648
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2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1
1 750 375 250 188 150 125 107 94 83
2 1500 750 500 375 300 250 214 188 167
3 2250 1125 750 563 450 375 321 281 250
4 3000 1500 1000 750 600 500 429 375 333
5 3750 1875 1250 938 750 625 536 469 417
D 4500 2250 1500 1125 900 750 643 563 500
7 5250 2625 1750 1313 1050 875 750 656 583
8 6000 3000 2000 1500 1200 1000 857 750 667
9 6750 3375 2250 1688 1350 1125 964 844 750
1 7500 3750 2500 1875 1500 1250 1071 938 833
Distance for TCT Speed v = 55 kph
(min)
Array Size, n
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1
1 917 458 306 229 183 153 131 115 102
2 1833 917 611 458 367 306 262 229 204
3 2750 1375 917 688 550 458 393 344 306
4 3667 1833 1222 917 733 611 524 458 407
5 4583 2292 1528 1146 917 764 655 573 509
6 5500 2750 1833 1375 1100 917 786 688 611
7 6417 3208 2139 1604 1283 1069 917 802 713
8 7333 3667 2444 1833 1467 1222 1048 917 815
9 8250 4125 2750 2063 1650 1375 1179 1031 917
1 9167 4583 3056 2292 1833 1528 1310 1146 1019
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APPENDIX E. PROBABILITY OF IDENTIFICATION
Section 8.2 introduces the probability of identification calculations used within the
models. These probabilities are based on conditional probability and derived from both
Bayes' Rule and the Law of Total Probability. This appendix shows the derivation of
Equation ( 8.3) and Equation (8.4]).
A. SINGLE SENSOR ARRAY
The simplest case is an array consisting of a single sensor placed along a road. For
the purposes of this analysis, it will still be considered an "array," and in fact will be the
basic building block of all larger arrays. This array, as with all the arrays to be discussed,
provides decision probabilities, P(TCT I //I), based on the sensor output and the fraction of
vehicle traffic assumed to be TCT. P(TCT I 1/1) is defined as the probability that the target
is a TCT given the sensor reports it as TCT. Similarly, P(TCT I 0/1 ) is the probability that
the target is TCT given the sensor reports it as non-TCT . In all cases, P^, the fraction of
vehicles assumed to be TCT, must be provided by some intelligence estimate.(Ref[5])
Let
f 1 if the target moving past the sensor is a TCT,
X = •!
I otherwise.
Each sensor outputs a forecast denoted by:
f lifthe sensor identifies the target as TCT,
F. = \
[ otherwise.
Additional sensors are denoted using increasing subscripts, i.e. /=/, 2, 3
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From sensor performance data provided by the manufacturer and field tests, the
forecast likeHhoods are given by
/, = P{ Sensor indicates a TCT given a TCT present}, and
/o = P{ Sensor indicates a TCT given no TCT present}.
That is,
/, = p{f = \\X = \}, and
/o = p{f = iix = o}.
For the simple one sensor case, using the forecast probabilities and Bayes' Rule,
the decision probabilities are [Ref. 4]:
f P
P(TCTI1 / 1) = —7 X ,
P(TCTIO / 1) = 7 r-^^ y \ r.
B. TWO SENSOR ARRAY
The two sensor array consists of two sensors spaced close enough to assume both
identification calls reported to the fusion center are on the same target. The theater
commander will be provided with the decision probabilities, P(TCT I k/n). As before, the
estimate, P^, must be provided by intelligence.
Each of the two sensors will output a forecast denoted by
f lif sensor 1 identifies the target as TCT,
F, = ^
I otherwise.
f lif sensor 2 identifies the target as TCT,
= ^
I otherwise.
If the sensors are assumed to be conditionally independent, then
P{F^ =ii,F^ zzi^\X=x}= P{F^ =i^\X = x}p{F-^ =i-^\X = x}, where i,xt {0, 1}.
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Also, since the sensors are identical, P(F^ =f\X = x) = PiF^ =/l X = x) for every/and x.
Therefore /|(|)= /,(2) and/o(,)= fQ^^y Henceforth,/, and /o will be used for the forecast
likelihoods of all identical sensors.
The decision probabilities are given by [Ref. 4]
P(TCTI2 / 2) =
P(TCT.i/2).
^^_^_^^;;;(;:f;^^^^^^_^^^ ,^
(\ - f V P
P(TCTI0/2)= ' "
(l-/,)^P,+(l-/o)^(l-/>J
C. GENERAL FORMALATION, n > 2
Similar results hold for the general case involving n>2 sensors. Again, assuming
conditional independence allows
p{f^ =h K = iJX = x}= p{f, =x}...p{f„ =iJX = x},
where /„, jc e {0,1 }. As above, the arrays are composed of identical sensors, and therefore
p{f, = IIX = \}= p{f„ = ]\X = \}= /, , and
p{f,=\\X =0}=P{F„=]\X = 0}=f,.
Now, let k equal the number of sensors in an array of size n to identify a passing target as a
TCT. From Bayes' Rule and the Law of Total Probability the decision probabilities for





This equation can be used for any array size with a given intelligence estimate of the TCT
population.
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D. FINDING k OR MORE OF n POLICY
Again assume that an array of n identical sensors is in place with forecast





APPENDIX F. k OR MORE OF n AND LOSS FUNCTION
COMPUTATIONS
The "at least A:-out-of-n" policy of Section 8.2 and the loss function introduced in
Section 8.3 are the driving forces behind the two models used in this thesis. Their roots
are based in decision theory and conditional probability. This appendix shows a complete
derivation of the k or more of n policy, and how it is used to generate the loss function,
l(n,k), of the optimization.
The decision required in this thesis is to choose an integer k, where 0<k<n, such
that the theater commander will take action if and only if at least k sensors indicate a vehicle
is a TCT. Recall that r, is the loss obtained if no action is taken and the vehicle is a TCT,
and /-J is the loss obtained if a non-TCT is acted against. The expected loss is
lin,k) = r,(p{X = 1,5 =0}+ P{X = 1,5 = \}+... + P{X = \,S = k - 1})+
/-2 (P{X = 0,5 = k}+ P{X = 0,S = k + \}+.. .+ P{X = 0,5 = n})
= r^P{X = \,S<k-\}+ r^P{X = 0,S>k}
= r,P{S<k-\,X = \}P^+ r^P{S > k,X =0]^\- P^ )
= r,B(k-\,nJ,)P^^r,(^-B{k-UJ,){\-P^))
where Bijc- ,«,/„) is the binomial distribution function given by ^
" (l - '
.
Figure F. 1 shows a Microsoft Excel v7.0 spreadsheet programmed to perform the




f1 = 0.8 0.2 = 1 -f1






k D:Act D: Not Act Policy D:Act D: Not Act Policy L* P(r1) P(r2)
1 0.3404 0.3000 *N' 0.1969 0.0000 'N' 0.3000 0.1500 0.0000
2 0.1197 0.3000 •A" 0.5096 0.0000 N' 0.1197 0.0000 0.3404
3 0.0288 0.2999 'A' 0.7303 0.0001 'N' 0.0289 0.0000 0.1197
4 0.0048 0.2991 'A' 0.8212 0.0009 'N' 0.0057 0.0005 0.0288
5 0.0005 0.2941 'A' 0.8452 0.0059 •N" 0.0064 0.0029 0.0048
6 0.0000 0.2743 'A' 0.8495 0.0257 •N' 0.0257 0.0128 0.0005
7 0.0000 0.2215 'A' 0.8500 0.0785 'N' 0.0785 0.0393 0.0000
8 0.0000 0.1309 'A' 0.8500 0.1691 'N' 0.1691 0.0846 0.0000
9 0.0000 0.0403 'A' 0.8500 0.2597 N' 0.2597 0.1299 0.0000
Figure G.l - Microsoft Excel *rograni
The numerical values on the table, with the exception of the probability columns
represent the relative losses with the values of r,, P^, n and k given. Columns two
through four represent the condition that k or more sensors indicate a TCT, while columns
five through seven represent the condition that fewer than k do so. Finally, columns nine
and ten are the probabilities that a "leaker" or a "false alarm" occur with the values given. It
is these values, combined with the losses in column eight that provide the data for the look
up tables in the earlier appendices.
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